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i 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis contains the specific description of Group Design Project (GDP) and 
Individual Research Project (IRP) that are undertaken by the author and form 
part of the degree of Master of Science. 
The target of GDP is to develop a novel and unique commercial flying wing 
aircraft titled FW-11. FW-11 is a three-year collaborative civil aircraft project 
between Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and Cranfield University. 
According to the market analysis result conducted by the author, 250 seats 
capacity and 7500 nautical miles were chosen as the design targets. 
The IRP is the further study of GDP, which is to enhance the competitive 
capability by deploying prognostics and health management (PHM) technology 
to the fuel system of FW-11. As a novel and brand-new technology, PHM 
enables the real-time transformation of system status data into alert and 
maintenance information during all ground or flight operating phases to improve 
the aircraft reliability and operating costs. Aircraft fuel system has a great 
impact on flight safety. Therefore, the development of fuel system PHM concept 
is necessary. 
This thesis began with an investigation of PHM, then a safety and reliability 
analysis of fuel system was conducted by using FHA, FMEA and FTA. 
According to these analyses, fuel temperature diagnosis and prognosis were 
chosen as a case study to improve the reliability and safety of FW-11. The PHM 
architecture of fuel temperature had been established. A fuel temperature 
prediction model was also introduced in this thesis. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background of PHM 
Due to the violent competition among civil airlines, it is increasingly eager that 
the demand for high efficiency civil aircraft. The appearance of Prognostics and 
Health Management (PHM) system, as a novel and brand-new technology, 
brings considerable benefits to such a need. 
1.1.1 PHM Definition 
According to Kalgren, PHM is “a health management approach that utilizes 
measurements, models, and software to perform incipient fault detection, 
condition assessment, and failure progression prediction” [1]. Health 
management concept is the capability to make appropriate decisions about 
maintenance actions based on real-time monitoring, diagnosis and prognosis 
information, available resources, and operational demand [2]. The PHM works 
through a network of onboard sensors collecting status data of the aircraft’s 
components, subsystems and system level elements, then transforms the data 
into information by using the built-in software and models, and then transfers 
them to the associate crews. The PHM system enables the real-time 
transformation of system status data into alert and maintenance information 
during all ground or flight operating phases, which can support pilots and 
ground maintenance crews for decision making. 
1.1.2 PHM Functions 
The primary PHM functions include real-time detection/monitoring, diagnosis 
and prognosis of aircraft health status. These primary functions are discussed in 
this thesis. The PHM also has other functions such as Mitigation and Integrity 
Assurance.  
The goal of the detection element is to develop validated technologies to detect 
anomalies from adverse events throughout the aircraft in hardware and in 
software, and the interactions between these two classes of systems [3]. Based 
on the advanced sensors technologies, the real-time detection/monitoring can 
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track and acquire the foundational data of ongoing aircraft health status 
systemically. 
The goal of the diagnosis element is to develop integrated and validated 
technologies to determine the causal factors, the nature and severity of an 
adverse event and to distinguish that event within a family of potential adverse 
events [3]. The health state data acquired by the detection function can be 
transmitted to the diagnosis function to isolate and classify the possible 
anomalous events rapidly. It means that, based on the detection function, 
diagnosis can identify the failure source or isolate the fault to related Line-
replaceable unit (LRU). 
The goal of the prognosis element is to determine, given the information from 
the detection and diagnosis health management systems and other systems, a 
validated estimate (i.e., with a measure of confidence) of the remaining useful 
life of the candidate failures generated by the diagnosis element [3]. Based on 
the aircraft health status data and advanced built-in models, the prognosis 
function can predict the remaining useful life (RUL) of relative system or LRU, or 
even forecast the remaining occurrence time of anomalous events which may 
cause catastrophic disaster. In other words, the prognosis enables the 
operators to forecast most of the relevant failures condition before it happens. 
1.2 PHM Benefits 
The PHM has the following advantages: 
1. Reduced cost and increased revenue. 
2. Improved aircraft safety and reliability. 
3. Minimised maintenance actions. 
4. Improved mission readiness and availability. 
5. Increased dispatch rate and competitiveness. 
6. Allow operators to assess the effectiveness of their fleets. 
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1.3 PHM Architecture 
Generally, the architecture of PHM system comprises a decision unit and some 
subunits to process different aircraft parameters. The architecture of a typical 
PHM system is shown as Figure 1-1. 
 
Figure 1-1 A Typical PHM Architecture [4] 
1.4 Aircraft Fuel System and PHM 
The primary function of the fuel system is to store enough fuel required by the 
mission and supply fuel to the engine and APU (auxiliary power unit) at proper 
rate, pressure and temperature under any operating conditions safely and 
continuously. During the mission, the fuel system should maintain the Centre of 
Gravity (CG) of aircraft within designated range. The fuel in the fuel tank also 
can be used as heat sinks to cool down other systems or components. 
Aircraft fuel system has a great impact on flight safety since most of accidents 
associated with fuel system lead to hazardous and even catastrophic events. 
The aircraft cannot sustain flight without the pressurised fuel flow to the engine 
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since the aircraft thrust and power is provided by engine. The deployment of the 
PHM into the fuel system can improve not only the aircraft safety and reliability, 
but also the turn-around time so as to increase the dispatch rate and 
competitiveness. 
1.5 Problem Statement 
As discussed in the previous paragraph, introducing PHM technology into the 
fuel system is very important since it has lots of benefits to the overall aircraft 
performance. However, as a new technology, little practical application to the 
fuel system has been done. Thus, a long period of time is needed for the PHM 
technology of fuel system development. 
The aircraft fuel system employs lots of components or LRUs, thus the real-time 
monitoring/detection, diagnosis and prognosis functions rely on the advanced 
hardware and software to handle the complicated parameters. This thesis will 
focus on the onboard software, especially the built-in prognostic model. It is a 
great challenge to find a proper software improvement way to improve the 
current fuel system PHM technology. 
1.6 Research Objectives 
This research aims to develop a fuel system health management method and 
implement this new technology to the fuel system of Flying Wing aircraft (FW-11) 
which is the Group Design Project (GDP) the author participated. 
FW-11 is a three-year collaborative civil aircraft project between Aviation 
Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and Cranfield University. It is an 
innovative 250-seat flying wing aircraft whose design range is 7500 nautical 
miles. The detail information and the work accomplished by the author are 
shown in the Appendix A.  
This Individual Research Project (IRP) is the further study of GDP. The 
temperature of fuel is chosen as a case study since this parameter has great 
impacts to the flight safety.  
The objectives of this research project are: 
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1. To design an assumed fuel system architecture of the FW-11. 
2. To develop a PHM method and implement it in the fuel system of FW-11. 
By deploying this method, it can greatly increase the competitive 
capability of FW-11. 
3. To develop an onboard fuel tank temperature PHM architecture. In order 
to deploy this technology into the practical application of aircraft fuel 
system, a fuel temperature prediction model is needed to be developed. 
1.7 Research Scope and Assumption 
The aircraft fuel system becomes more complicated with the development of 
technologies. It consists of numerous electrical, electronic and mechanical 
components such as pumps, valves, tubes, and sensors to perform the various 
operating functions. Thus, in order to accomplish the research targets, this 
research will base on the fuel system of FW-11. It means that the assumed fuel 
system architecture of FW-11 should be accomplished firstly. All the IRP 
research work will be based on this assumption. 
Furthermore, shown as Table 1-1, the PHM technology is a wide concept which 
covers various aspects and fields associated with flight safety. So this thesis will 
focus on developing and implementing the main PHM functions illustrated in the 
previous section. 
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Table 1-1 PHM Technology [2] 
 
1.8 Methodology 
As a new technology, few airliners in the world have deployed the practical fuel 
system PHM successfully. Thus, the public articles about the aircraft fuel 
system PHM are inadequate. New methods are expected to be appeared and 
verified to develop this new technology. 
In the PHM research procedure, the first step is to find out the critical system 
functions need to be monitored or detected by using approved method. 
Consequently, the system malfunctions or component failures need to be 
identified through an appropriate diagnostic approach, and then a reasonable 
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prognostic method should be confirmed to predict the RUL of 
subsystems/components or forecast the remaining occurrence time of 
anomalous events which may cause catastrophic disaster. The real-time 
detection/monitoring, diagnosis and prognosis data should be recorded in the 
onboard database or transmitted to the warehouse via the data link between 
ground and aircraft. 
Finally, the fuel temperature prognostic method in the fuel tank will be 
discussed as a case study. 
1.8.1 Detection/Monitoring 
The fuel system consists of so many components to perform the various 
functions that the identification of the signal or LRU status need to be detected 
or monitored for the following analysis and process is necessary. It seems 
unreasonable to monitor all the signals and components status during flight or 
on the ground whilst considering the increase of complexity and weight.  Thus, 
the system critical functions must be identified for the detection/monitoring 
function. 
In order to build a reliable PHM system, the following mature methods are 
employed to identify the system and component failure modes: 
1. Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) 
2. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
3. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
The critical system functions can be investigated by using these analysis 
methods above. 
1.8.2 Diagnosis 
Diagnosis is the specific process of recognising the status of a subsystem or a 
component to perform its functions based on the results of detection/monitoring 
function. Generally, diagnostic capability is often considered a two step process, 
the first being the identification that a fault has occurred and then localizing the 
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cause of the fault to a specific component, ideally at the lowest assembly level 
to reduce costs [2].  
The following diagnostic systems have been applied on aircraft: 
1. Rule-based experts system. 
2. Model-based reasoning system. 
3. Case-based reasoning system. 
4. Learning system. 
This thesis focuses on the rule-based expert system and model-based 
reasoning system. The detail discussion of these diagnostic systems is in the 
literature review. In order to fulfil the research aims, the FTA is used to develop 
an intelligent rule-based expert system and a fuel temperature prediction model 
is also constructed for the mode-based reasoning system. 
1.8.3 Prognosis 
Prognosis is the special course of predicting the RUL of a crucial component 
based on the detection/monitoring and diagnosis. It can also forecast the crucial 
parameters during flight. Five mainly used prognostic approaches are shown 
below: 
1. Statistical reliability and usage-based approach 
2. Trend-based evolutionary approach 
3. Data-driven model-based approach 
4. State estimator based approach 
5. Physics-based modelling approach 
In this thesis, a data-driven model-based approach is used to predict the fuel 
temperature trends during flight. The detail discussion of these prognostic 
approaches is in the literature review. 
1.8.4 Fuel Temperature Prediction 
The fuel temperature has great impact on the flight safety. Cold fuel will cause 
the fuel-feed line blockage and hot fuel will increase the risks of fuel tank 
explosion. For the international civil airliners, the fuel capacity is enormous. 
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Once the fuel temperature beyond the danger point, it needs a long time to 
recover this parameter after specific actions have been done. 
For a fixed aircraft fuel system, the rate at which the fuel temperature changes 
is a function of air temperature, heat from heat exchangers, specific heat 
capacity, the inlet fuel flow rate, the outlet fuel flow rate, the inlet fuel 
temperature, the fuel mass within the fuel tank, the fuel temperature in the fuel 
tank and time. Based on the thermodynamic study of the fuel tank heat transfer 
mechanism, a formula of fuel temperature changes can be derived. The 
prognostic method is based on this formula which will be discussed later. 
1.9 Thesis Organization 
There are seven chapters in this thesis. The second chapter is the literature 
review of the PHM technology. Chapter three introduces the assumed fuel 
system architecture of FW-11, followed by Chapter four which is the fuel system 
study including FHA, FMEA and FTA. After these analyses, fuel temperature is 
selected as the case study to be discussed in Chapter five. Chapter six is the 
fuel temperature PHM study. The fuel temperature PHM architecture which 
integrates the monitoring, diagnosis and prognosis functions is established. The 
diagnostic function is achieved by using rule-based expert system and model-
based reasoning system. The data-driven model-based prognostic approach is 
used to achieve the prognostic function. The last chapter is the conclusion and 
future work of IRP. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 PHM Technology Overview 
2.1.1 PHM Outline 
The definition of PHM concept is “the processes, techniques, and technologies 
used to design, analyse, build, verify, and operate a system to prevent faults 
and/or mitigate their effects” [5]. PHM develops and combines lots of concepts, 
technologies and management methods. Table 2-1 shows the evolution of 
health management technology of Department of Defence (DoD) and NASA. 
Table 2-1 Evolution of Health Management Technologies [5] 
 
It is clear that the derivation of current health management technologies is 
aviation flight safety concepts and techniques. The practical application of PHM 
technology, such as diagnostics, condition-based maintenance, prognostics, 
and health management, was from 1970s. A-7, for which the Engine Monitoring 
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System was developed, is the milestone of the early PHM technology, shown as 
Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1 Relative Evolution of PHM Systems for Navy Aircraft [6] 
2.1.2 PHM Technical Approach 
Because of the complexity of PHM technology, it is divided into four levels 
generally. Figure 2-2 shows the overall technical approach of PHM technology. 
Level 1 is the foundational research to support the whole project. Level 2 
provides the validated technologies of the primary aircraft systems to enable the 
Level 3 whose goal is to develop integrated tools enabling the PHM functions. 
The target of Level 4 is to develop validated multidisciplinary PHM technologies, 
tools and techniques to enable the PHM functions. The research results of each 
level are finally integrated to realize the PHM technology into practical 
application. 
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Figure 2-2 PHM Technical Approach [3] 
2.1.3 Current State of the Art 
The current PHM system focuses on putting various onboard sensors and 
intelligent software to interpret the output streams automatically. These data 
were provided to prognostic systems as inputs to assess the structural integrity 
and remaining component/subsystem life. One of the state-of-the-art health 
management systems is Honeywell’s Aircraft Diagnostic and Maintenance 
System (ADMS) [3]. 
The ADMS is an avionics system in which fault propagation model is used in the 
Boeing 777. It is evolved from several previously used maintenance system. 
The ADMS includes the Central Maintenance Computer (CMC), Aircraft 
Conditioning Monitoring Function (ACMF), and the built-in-test (BIT) 
functionality of the various systems on the aircraft. It covers more than 200 
aircraft subsystems and provides maintenance interface to all subsystems. 
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ADMS performs root cause diagnostics to eliminate cascading faults and 
provide correlation between system faults and flight deck effects [3]. 
2.2 PHM Functions 
The figure below shows a typical architecture of health management operating 
functions. It is a reflection of the time-dependent repetitive feedback processes 
typical of dynamic systems [5]. This figure illustrates the typical PHM 
technologies and its operating process of status monitoring, failure detection, 
data transmission and response, diagnostics, prognostics, and maintenance. 
The relation between the primary functions of PHM technologies also is shown 
in this chart. 
 
Figure 2-3 Health Management Functional Flow Chart [5] 
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According to the flow chart above, the following process are required while 
determining a system health status: 
1. Detecting the symptoms of failure, from collection of raw sensor data to 
analysis and tests; 
2. Diagnosis of the root cause; 
3. Determining the effects of the condition; 
4. Predicting the progression of the conditions [7].  
2.3 PHM Technologies 
2.3.1 Monitoring 
Currently, the monitoring function capabilities in PHM mainly comprise the 
sensor technology, data acquisition/extraction and data communication. It 
means that the current development of monitoring function is focusing on the 
performance of data acquisition and bus transmission. All these issues are not 
included in this IRP report. The author is trying to determine the parameters or 
component status which needed to be acquired to fulfil the fuel system 
monitoring function. 
In order to get the key parameters which have great impacts to the aircraft flight 
safety, the FHA and FMEA approaches are used to analyse the fuel system. 
Both FHA and FMEA are fundamental research approaches not only for 
implementing the monitoring function, but also for the diagnostic and prognostic 
capability. 
2.3.2 Diagnosis 
As an essential function of PHM technology, diagnosis is the procedure of 
detecting and identifying the cause of any adverse or abnormal events. This 
capability is based on sufficient data from monitoring system. The results of 
FHA and FMECA are also required to define the function and failure modes of 
each component or subsystem. Currently, diagnostics employ system FHA, 
FMECA, FTA results and combine with detected data to identify the causes and 
severity of an adverse event. As for the diagnostic system, rule-based expert 
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system, case-based reasoning system, model-based reasoning system, and 
learning system are commonly used to diagnose anomalous conditions based 
on the signals from the detection/monitoring system [8]. 
The typical diagnostic procedure consists of three steps: observation, 
comparison and diagnosis which are shown as figure below.  
 
Figure 2-4 Typical Diagnostic Procedure [8] 
Normally, observation is based upon the detection/monitoring techniques to 
obtain the essential data or signals such as voltage, current and temperature. In 
the second step, the primary functions of the comparison are data or signals 
processing which include comparing the observed data with expected behaviour 
and determining the status of key components or parameters. Lastly, the 
diagnostic reasoning engine is used to identify and localise the cause of 
adverse event to a specific component or casual factor. There are four widely 
used diagnostic techniques which are shown in the following parts. 
2.3.2.1 Rule-based Expert System 
As a typical artificial intelligent technique, rule-based expert system has widely 
application for diagnostic tasks where expertise and experience are available 
but deep understanding of the physical properties of the system is either 
unavailable or too costly to obtain [8]. 
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The basic reasoning rule statement is “if-then-else”. These “rules” are simple 
patterns and the reasoning engine will search for the matched patterns in the 
data [2]. A set of rules can be incorporated into a rule-based expert system, 
which can then be used to generate diagnostic solutions [8].  
The rule-based reasoning chaining is illustrated below. The first step is to match 
the observed facts and established rules. If these two items can totally match 
through only one rule, the diagnostic result will be implemented directly. If more 
than one rule matched, a pre-defined strategy is used to establish and examine 
the conflict set. The priorities of applicable rules were assigned by this strategy 
[8]. 
 
Figure 2-5 Rule-based Expert System [8] 
2.3.2.2 Case-based reasoning system 
Case-based reasoning system is a specific reasoning engine of knowledge 
solutions which uses past problems to solve new problems. It refers to both a 
cognitive and a computational model of reasoning by analogy to past cases [2]. 
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A typical architecture of case-based reasoning system is shown as the figure 
below. 
 
Figure 2-6 Case-based Reasoning System [8] 
The case-based reasoning system is a four-step process. The first step of this 
system is to retrieve the past cases from Domain Knowledge Library to solve a 
new problem. The case should include the problem, solution, and annotations 
such as information about the derivation of its solution. The second step is to 
map the solution from the previous case to solve the new problem after the 
difference between these two cases were acquired. The new solution is 
conducted by adapting the old solution to fit the new situation. The third step is 
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to test the proposed solution, and revise the proposed solution if it fails. Lastly, 
after the proposed solution has been adapted to the target problem successfully, 
this new solution is retained into Domain Knowledge Library. 
A basic premise in case-based reasoning system is that many problems that 
decision makers encounter are not unique, but rather they are variations of a 
problem type [2]. This technique is well suited for poorly understood problem 
areas for which structured data is available to characterize operating scenarios 
[8]. 
2.3.2.3 Model-based Reasoning System 
Model-based reasoning system is a wide category that describes the use of a 
broad variety of engineering models as the foundation for the knowledge and 
the techniques applied for diagnosis [8]. A typical model-base reasoning system 
is shown below. 
 
Figure 2-7 Model-based Reasoning System [8] 
The model-based approach compares how the system is actually performing to 
the manner in which the model expects the system to perform given its actual 
operating conditions [9]. If there is dissimilarity between the physical system 
and the compared model, an analysis process shall be conducted in order to 
find and determine the reason for the discrepancy. The accurate and sufficient 
physical models are required by the model-based reasoning system to enable 
the full range of operational characteristics to implement the comparison 
accurately under various conditions. 
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One of the fundamental advantages of model-based techniques is that, it can 
be set up such that the model, running with the same inputs/commands as the 
actual engine, will only predict the nominal outputs [10]. However, a draw-back 
of model-based reasoning is that it is typically based on static knowledge and is 
often difficult or expensive to grow with actual experiential data [2]. 
2.3.2.4 Learning System 
Learning system is a data-driven approach which is derived directly from 
routinely-monitored system operating data [8]. The data-driven approach 
provides monitoring capability to detect its own model establishing through 
system data elements. Normally, learning system technique uses the following 
five steps to implement detection and diagnostic decisions. The first step – high 
impact malfunction determination is relied on using the past data to understand 
the types, severity and locations of actual and possible failures. As the second 
step, data selection, transformation, diagnosis and preparation are the main 
functions to establish the final database for classification and model sets. After 
that, data processing is needed to detect trends and degradation, and assess 
the severity of a failure for early warning. The forth step is testing and validation 
which ensure the quality of model sets. At last, results fusion method provides 
higher diagnostic accuracy to predict fault severity and assess the system 
health condition. The learning systems technique provides the ability to handle 
highly collinear data of high dimensionality, substantially reduce the 
dimensionality of the monitoring problem, and compress the data for archiving 
purposes. However, the main drawback of it is that its efficacy is highly 
dependent on the quantity and quality of system operational data [8].  
2.3.2.5 Discussion 
The rule-based expert system will be a good choice for automatically 
diagnosing situations in which the diagnosis of failure events in a system is a 
well-known, stable process and expertise exists [8]. Thus, it is very suitable for 
aircraft fuel system to realize the automated failure diagnosis. 
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For the diagnosis of mechanical components associated with the fuel 
temperature, the model-based reasoning system can locate the failed 
components by comparing the actual and expected performance of fuel system. 
In the conceptual design phase of FW-11, the past case and data are 
unavailable. Therefore, at this stage, the case-based reasoning system and 
learning system are not suitable for the fuel system PHM development. 
2.3.3 Prognosis 
For the gradually occurred components/subsystems and health status modes, 
decisions should be made before the harmful situation occurred. This prediction 
of the future state is known as prognostics [7]. In PHM, the term “prognostics” 
includes the broad functions of fault/failure detection and isolation, enhanced 
diagnostics, material conditions, performance monitoring, and life tracking, 
rather than just prognosticate functions alone [11]. It means that the prognostic 
capability, real-time monitoring and diagnostic capability are connected tightly. 
In the early time of health management development, the relevant technologies 
were traditionally focused on failure detection and isolation. As the increasing 
requirements of condition-based maintenance and low-cost logistics, the 
concept of the prediction of RUL is introduced into the health management 
development platform. The main goal of the prognostic technology is to provide 
a validated prediction of the RUL for either a component or a system. 
Prognostic system can reduce the overall life cycle costs by decreasing the 
maintenance cost through the implement of the capabilities presented. 
The figure below summarizes the range of possible prognostic approaches as a 
function of the applicability to various systems and their relative implementation 
cost [12]. 
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Figure 2-8 Prognosis Technical Approaches [12] 
The development of the prognostic technology is based on a variety of 
techniques such as mathematical methods, probabilistic/statistical methods, 
artificial intelligence tools, and computational intelligence arena. The following 
sections describe five mainly used prognostic approaches. 
2.3.3.1 Statistical Reliability and Usage-based Approach 
Statistical reliability and usage-based approach is a historical data-based 
method which needs the historical statistics of component or LRU failure and 
operational usage profile, sometimes along with the relevant failure rate 
statistics. Typically, failure and/or inspection data is compiled from legacy 
systems and a Weibull distribution or other statistical failure distribution can be 
fitted to the data [12].  
The statistical reliability and usage-based approach is an appropriate method to 
achieve the prognostic capability for the components which have very low 
failure rates or low failure severity level, have few or no sensed data associated 
with. 
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2.3.3.2 Trend-based Evolutionary Approach 
Trend-based evolutionary approach relies on the comparison between the 
failure damage probability model based on the historical data and the current 
multi-parameters probability state space to implement the detection of current 
health condition and the analysis of trend deviations. In other words, this 
method is to use the interface between the current parameters probability space 
and the known damage probability space to conduct the quantitative inference. 
Generally, trend-based prognostics works well for system level degradation 
because conditional loss is typically the result of interaction of multiple 
components functioning improperly as a whole [12].  
2.3.3.3 Data-driven Model-based Approach 
In many cases, the historical or statistical data is difficult to be obtained. Or in 
other instances, even though the sufficient statistical or failure database is 
available for a component or system, it is still difficult to complement the 
prediction of failure progression. In such situations, data-driven model-based 
approach will be a reasonable choice. Data-driven model-based approach 
provides a nonlinear network method which uses some specific algorithms set 
in the calculation model to obtain the prediction outputs related to the failure 
condition. Figure 2-11 shows an example of this prognostic approach. 
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Figure 2-9 Data-driven Model-based Approaches [12] 
2.3.3.4 State Estimator Based Approach 
State estimator based approach is based on the tracking filter technique to 
enable the prognostic capability. It is a dynamical systems tool for estimating 
unknown states by combining current measurements with the most recent state 
estimate [12]. 
This approach can be regarded as a virtual sensor in which currently available 
sensor measurements are taken to provide optimal estimates of quantities of 
interest which cannot be measured directly [12]. It can be used in not only a 
linear system, but also a nonlinear system by some specific filter algorithms. 
2.3.3.5 Physics-based Modelling Approach 
Differing from the prognostic techniques above, physics-based modelling 
approach is a complicated and comprehensive modelling method so as to 
estimate the failure mode progression for a component or system. Physics-
based modelling approach is a combination or fusion of the feature-based and 
model-based approaches provides full prognostic ability over the entire life of 
the component, thus providing valuable information for planning which 
components to inspect during specific overhauls periods [12]. It also integrates 
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the physical modelling method and stochastic modelling technique to provide 
the prediction output of the RUL for a component or system. 
2.3.3.6 Discussion 
To perform the prognostic function, the historical data are required by the 
former two approaches. However, in the conceptual design phase of FW-11, 
there is no historical data available. Thus, neither the statistical reliability and 
usage-based approach nor the trend-based evolutionary approach is 
reasonable at this stage. 
State estimator based approach is mainly used to estimate the unknown states 
of components or system. Physics-based modelling approach focuses on the 
prognosis of RUL of component or system. These two approaches are not 
suitable for the fuel temperature prediction. 
By using specific algorithms set in the calculation model, the data-driven model-
based approach can predict the fuel temperature trends during flight. The fuel 
temperature prognostic function will be achieved through this approach. 
2.4 Fuel Temperature Prediction 
The open of four cross-polar routes is an important development for the long 
range civil aviation transport. These routes provide reducing in time and fuel so 
as to have great advantages on the environment. Due to the extremely cold 
weather in the polar region, the long time exposure of aircraft fuel tanks to the 
low outside temperature may cause the fuel temperature drops close to or 
below the fuel freezing point (FFP). Both Boeing and Airbus have designed 
software to aid the flight crews in addressing the cold fuel or fuel freezing issues 
at the flight planning stage for a given route [20]. 
Take the Airbus’s fuel temperature prediction software for example: the 
software accepts inputs such as performance (altitude, speed, fuel on Board), 
navigation information (waypoints, time, distance) and weather forecast 
(temperatures) to predict the fuel temperature in each fuel tank during the flight, 
then the warnings and advisories will be provided to the pilots [13]. The fuel 
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temperature prediction software can advise the pilots to fly faster or fly lower in 
order to avoid the freezing fuel issues. 
2.5 Conclusions 
PHM system is to assess the health status of the vehicle or system, provide 
diagnosis and prognosis of system faults and deliver recommendations for 
remediation [14]. The concept of PHM is revolutionary and pushes the state-of-
the-art in logistics and maintenance management [15]. The PHM system should 
incorporate a philosophy, methodology and process that focus on design and 
development for safety, operability, maintainability, reliability and testability [16]. 
There are some PHM systems have been developed and put into practice, 
however, more accurate, reliable and automated health management 
technologies are highly needed because of the uncertainties in the current 
complex system or aircraft. 
In order to deploy the PHM system to aircraft fuel system, three primary 
functions need to be achieved: detection/monitoring, diagnosis and prognosis. 
Therefore, the key parameters and crucial components which have great 
impacts to the system performance need to be identified by using FHA and 
FMEA. 
In this chapter, four diagnostic techniques have been discussed briefly. Each 
method has its own advantages and disadvantages. The former two techniques 
require many diverse domain knowledge based on engineering experiences. 
The latter two systems need a great amount of accurate physical model and 
operating data of a system. After the comparison of these four techniques, the 
rule-based expert system and the model-based reasoning system are more 
suitable for the fuel system PHM development.  
As a new and crucial element of PHM system, the current prognostic technique 
mainly focuses on the indication of the failure mode progression and the 
prediction of the RUL for specific components or subsystems. However, the 
crucial parameters which have great impact to the safety during flight also 
should be monitored, diagnosed, and prognosticated.  
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Five widely used prognostic approaches are introduced in this chapter. Each 
approach has its own characteristics. After considering the type of prognostic 
target and the progress of FW-11, the data-driven model-based approach is 
chosen to predict the fuel temperature during flight. 
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3 Fuel System of FW-11 
In order to deploy the fuel system PHM technology to the FW-11 to increase its 
competitiveness, an assumed fuel system should be designed firstly. All 
research works in this thesis depend on this assumed fuel system. Base on the 
assumed fuel system, the FHA, FMEA and FTA are conducted to find out the 
failure modes and effects of this fuel system. Furthermore, the fuel temperature 
PHM architecture can also be established. 
The FW-11 is a long range point to point civil aircraft, which basic seat is 248 
and design range is 7500 nautical miles. More details of FW-11 are addressed 
in Appendix A. According to the General Requirements of FW-11, the minimum 
requirements for the FW-11 are airworthiness regulations from FAA, EASA and 
CAAC, correspondingly, the fuel system design should meets these regulations 
at least. 
3.1 Fuel System Architecture 
The primary functions of the fuel system are to store enough fuel required by 
the mission and to supply fuel to the engine and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) at 
proper rate, pressure and temperature under any operating conditions safely 
and continuously. During the mission, the fuel system should maintain the CG 
of aircraft within designated range. The fuel in the fuel tank can also be used as 
heat sinks to cool down other systems or components. 
The fuel system of FW-11 consists of 6 subsystems which are shown as below: 
1. Storage subsystem;  
2. Fuel feed (engine and APU) subsystem; 
3. Refuel/defuel subsystem; 
4. Fuel jettison subsystem; 
5. Vent/ Inerting subsystem; 
6. Fuel indication and management subsystem. 
These subsystems are shown in the following figures. 
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Figure 3-1 Fuel Storage Subsystem 
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Figure 3-2 Fuel Feed Subsystem 
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Figure 3-3 Refuel/Defuel Subsystem 
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Figure 3-4 Fuel Jettison Subsystem 
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Figure 3-5 Vent/Inerting Subsystem 
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Figure 3-6 Fuel Indication and Management Subsystem 
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All components which are used in the assumed fuel system are shown in Table 
3-1. 
Table 3-1 List of Components 
Item Components Item Components 
1 AC Boost Pump 19 Shutoff Valve 
2 DC APU Pump 20 Heat Exchanger 
3 Shutoff Valve 21 Filter 
4 Check Valve 22 OBIGGS 
5 Suction Feed Check Valve 23 Control Valve 
6 Suction Feed Inlet Screen 24 Tank Pressure Sensor 
7 Scavenge Ejector Pump 25 Vent Valve 
8 Flapper Check Valve 26 Flame Arrestor 
9 Cross Feed Shutoff Valve 27 Safety Valve 
10 Pressure Sensor 28 Fuel Management Computer 
11 Refuel Adaptor 29 Fuel Quantity Probe 
12 Integrated Refuel Panel 30 Fuel Densitometer 
13 Refuel Valve 31 Low Level Sensor 
14 Float Valve 32 Fuel Temperature Sensor 
15 Manifold Isolation Valve 33 Water Detector 
16 Refuel Pressure Sensor 34 Fuel Measuring Stick 
17 Jettison Pump 35 Water Drain Valve 
18 Jettison Shut off Valve   
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3.2 Fuel System Functions 
The target of this section is to illustrate the operational functions of the assumed 
fuel system for the following FHA, FMEA and FTA application. The primary 
function of the assumed fuel system is to supply a continuous fuel at proper rate, 
pressure and temperature to the engines and APU safely under any designated 
operating conditions. The detail functions of storage and fuel feed sub-systems 
are discussed in the following parts. 
3.2.1 Storage Subsystem 
The fuel storage subsystem is primarily used to holds the fuel necessary for 
both engines and APU operation. It should have enough strength to maintain 
the designated relative pressure to the outer atmosphere. It also provides 
maintenance access to the ground crews and helps them to drain the fuel tanks. 
As shown in Figure 3-1, the storage subsystem of FW-11 comprises five fuel 
tanks: Centre Tank, two Inner Tanks and two Outer Tanks. The total design fuel 
capacity and the maximum fuel capacity are 72740kg and 96780kg respectively. 
The Centre Tank is located under the cabin floor and surrounded by double wall 
structure, a spanwise beam divides it into two parts: Forward Tank and Aft Tank. 
The Forward Tank is used as the collector tank, into which the fuel is delivered 
before being fed to the engines or APU. There are flapper check valves 
installed in this beam, permit the fuel flow from Aft Tank to forward by gravity in 
case of ejector pump failure but prevent fuel flow to the reverse direction. A set 
of overflow ports are located in the top of the spanwise beam to let redundant 
fuel flow back to Aft Tank so as to protect the collector tank. 
Both Outer and Inner tanks are integral fuel tanks. The left side and right side 
are symmetrical, for convenient, the left side is selected as an example to 
illustrate the fuel tank configuration. The Outer Tank is in the outer wing box of 
the outer wing, and the Inner Tank is in the inner wing box of inner wing. The 
Outer Tank and Inner Tank are partly isolated by structural rib, in which flapper 
check valves are installed to permit fuel flow from outboard tank to inboard tank 
by gravity but prevent fuel flow to the reverse direction. A set of overflow ports 
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are located in the top of the rib to let redundant fuel flow back to Outer Tank so 
as to protect the Inner tank. 
The Inner tank is separated into Forward Inner Tank and Aft Inner Tank by a 
spanwise beam. The previous tank is used as collector tank to receive fuel flow 
from Aft Inner Tank and Outer Tank. Similarly, flapper check valves are installed 
in this beam to permit the fuel flow from Aft Tank to Forward Tank by gravity in 
case of ejector pump fails but prevent fuel flow to the reverse direction. This 
beam is a bulkhead so that the fuel in the collector tank cannot back to the Aft 
Inner Tank. 
An adjacent surge tank is outboard of each Outer Tank. Surge tanks collect fuel 
overflow from outer tank in case of aircraft manoeuvre. The fuel overflow drains 
into the outer tanks through ejector pump located in the surge tanks or the 
check valves in the bottom of structural rib by gravity. 
There are heat exchangers in each collector tank to sink the heat from inerting 
subsystem and hydraulic system. 
3.2.2 Fuel Feed Subsystem 
As shown in Figure 3-2, a cross feed shutoff valve divide the fuel feed 
subsystem into left and right fuel feed lines to make sure each side feeds the 
engine independently. During normal operation, the cross feed shutoff valve 
remains closed to isolate the left and right fuel feed lines. The cross feed shutoff 
valve could open to provides fuel from both tanks to one engine in case of one 
engine malfunction or provides fuel to both engines from one side fuel tank 
when there is a lateral imbalance. 
The fuel feed subsystem consists of two AC boost pumps per inner tank and 
another two AC boost pumps in the centre tank for engines in each side 
respectively. Each AC boost pump is fully capable of maintain fuel flow to one 
engine and provide motive flow to the connected ejector pumps in case of a 
single pump failure. A DC pump is installed in the left inner tank for the APU 
and engine start, it could be shut off when the AC boost pumps are working. 
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There are shutoff valves in each engine and APU fuel feed lines to shut off fuel 
flow into the fire zones in case of engines and APU catching on fire. 
Ejector pumps are used to minimize unusable fuel and scavenge condensed 
water to the collector tanks. They are installed in the lower point of the other fuel 
tanks except the collector tanks and are operated by the motive flow supply 
provided from the AC boost pump(s). 
The fuel consumption order is shown as below:  
1. Centre tank - should be consumed first for safety consideration, the fuel 
would be jettisoned when crash landing occurred or for landing weight 
reduction if necessary. 
2. Aft Inner Tank – after the exhaustion of centre tank, this tank will be 
consumed for the Centre of Gravity (CG) adjustment consideration. 
3. Outer tank – this tank is the next-to-last tank since the fuel in the outer 
tank can unload the wing. 
4. Forward Inner tank – this tank is used as collector tank so that it is 
consumed lastly. 
3.2.3 Refuel/Defuel Subsystem 
The refuel subsystem is used to transfer fuel required by the mission from the 
refuel adapters, which connect to the ground pressure refuelling system directly, 
to the fuel tanks. Contrary, the defuel subsystem moves fuel from the aircraft 
fuel tanks to the ground refuel station, or from one fuel tank into another. 
There is a refuel station on the leading edge of left wing of FW-11, outboard of 
the Inner Tank. It has two refuel adapters and an Integrated Refuel Panel (IRP). 
FW-11 employs ten hydro-mechanical refuel valves which are shown in figure 
3-3. The valves are mounted on the spar, of which bodies are inside the fuel 
tanks and actuators are outside the fuel tanks.  
There are two modes can be chosen for the pressure refuelling of FW-11: 
automatic mode or manual mode. Both modes require the vent valve open to 
vent the fuel tank or excess fuel while refuelling the aircraft. There is no gravity 
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refuelling adaptor in FW-11 since it will take too much time for the refuelling of 
the enormous amount of onboard fuel. This configuration is similar to Boeing 
777. 
In the automatic mode, the total quantity fuel need to be loaded is entered in the 
Fuel Management Computer (FMC) through the Integrated Refuel Panel. The 
FMC uses this input to control the refuelling of each tank so that the fuel is 
refuelled into the fuel tanks automatically. Each surge tank has a float shutoff 
valve to shut off all the refuel valves by sending signals to the IRP to remove 
power from all the refuel valves when there was overfill fuel entered the surge 
tank. 
In the manual mode, the operating statuses of the refuel valves are controlled 
by the refuel valve switches on the IRP and then refuel each tank to a desired 
quantity. Fuel quantity measuring sticks are equipped in the bottom of each tank 
for the fuel quantity indication when there was no display on the IRP. A high-
level float shutoff valve is installed in each tank to close the relative refuel 
valve(s) if the fuel level reached the designated level to protect the fuel tanks.  
To defuel the fuel tanks, the fuel pumps are used to pump the fuel out of the 
tanks to the refuel/defuel manifold tubes, flow across the refuel valves in each 
tanks, finally enter into the ground tanks or defuel trucks through the refuel 
adaptors. The refuel/defuel subsystem also can transfer fuel from one tank to 
another by open the appropriate pumps and applicable refuel valves. The cross 
feed valve and manifold isolation valve must open to transfer the fuel in the right 
inner or right outer tank to other tanks through the engine feed manifold. 
3.2.4 Fuel Jettison Subsystem 
The fuel jettison subsystem dumps fuel overboard to reduce the landing weight 
or empty the centre fuel tank to protect the passengers whilst crashing landing 
occurred. The fuel jettison subsystem is shown in figure 3-4. 
There are two jettison pumps in the Aft Centre Tank and collector tank to 
jettison the fuel in these tanks respectively. Normally, the jettison pumps in the 
Aft Centre Tank are used to reduce the landing weight. The jettison pumps in 
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the collector tank will operate while crashing landing occurred. Each pump has 
a pressure switch that sends a signal to the FMC for fault indication. 
Two fuel jettison nozzle valves are installed near the tips of outer wing, 
outboard the surge tank. During jettison operation, these valves are open to 
overboard the fuel. One valve failure will not cause the loss of jettison function. 
3.2.5 Vent/ Inerting Subsystem 
The fuel vent subsystem keeps the appropriate relative pressure of the fuel 
tanks to the outside atmosphere throughout the aircraft operational fight 
envelope since a large pressure difference can damage the fuel tank structure. 
An ‘open vent system’ is commonly used in the civil airliners to connect the 
upper space in the fuel tank to the outer atmosphere. 
The FAA issued Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88 in April 2001, 
applicable to aircrafts registered in the USA [24]. A similar document – JAA 
INT/POL 25/12 was produced by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), 
mandatory for all airbus aircrafts [25]. These documents categorise the centre 
fuel tank as hazardous since this fuel tank is near the air conditioning units 
which represent a significant heat source to the fuel temperature. Thus, the 
centre fuel tank inerting is required. 
The fuel vent/inerting subsystem of FW-11 keeps the appropriate relative 
pressure of the fuel tanks to the outside atmosphere and by inerting the 
airspace in the fuel tanks to protect the fuel tanks. The inerting gas is obtained 
from an On-Board Inert Gas Generating System (OBIGGS). Figure 3-5 shows 
the vent/inerting subsystem. 
Each fuel tank is vented to a surge tank outboard the outer tank. A vent valve is 
installed in each surge tank to allow a direct air connection between the fuel 
tank ullage space and the outer atmosphere during the refuelling operation or in 
the event of the innerting system malfunction, or aircraft descended dramatically. 
There are flame arrestors in the vent ports to make sure that a flame does not 
come inside the fuel tanks through the vent subsystem. A safety valve and an 
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anti-vacuum valve are installed in each surge tank to relief the pressure 
difference or negative pressure in the fuel tank. 
3.2.6 Fuel Indication and Management Subsystem 
The fuel indication subsystem has these functions: indicating the fuel quantity, 
indicating the water in the fuel tank, indicating the fuel temperature, and 
indicating the fuel pressure. 
The fuel management subsystem are used to monitor the fuel system status 
and control the fuel system operation based upon plenty of pumps, valves, 
probes, sensors and switches controlled by the FMC. 
Fuel indication and management subsystem of FW-11 is shown in figure 3-6. 
A set of fuel quantity probes are installed to measure the fuel volume of each 
tank, the number of fuel probes is needed to be determined. There is a fuel 
densitometer used as the compensator in each tank to measure the fuel density. 
The fuel probes and densitometers send signals to the FMC to calculate the fuel 
quantity, and then the FMC sends both the total fuel quantity and individual tank 
quantities to the IRP and Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) 
so as to control the refuel operations and alert the crews respectively. 
A low level sensor is located in each collector tank to warn the pilots through the 
EICAS. 
Each fuel tank has a water detector at the low point in the tank sump area to 
monitor the water accumulation. Each fuel tank also has a fuel temperature 
sensor to gauge the fuel temperature. 
There is a fuel pressure switch installed in the outlet of each fuel pump, before 
the check valve in the flow direction. These fuel pressure switches are used to 
send low pressure signals to the FMC in case of fuel pump malfunction. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the fuel system architecture for FW-11 has been constructed 
according to the design requirements. The operational principle has also been 
defined to conduct the failure modes of fuel system. It provides foundation to 
the following FHA, FMEA and FTA analyses. 
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4 Fuel System Study 
The following paragraphs discuss the results of fuel system FHA, FMEA and 
FTA for the assumed fuel system of FW-11 stated in the previous chapter. 
4.1 Fuel System FHA 
4.1.1 Introduction 
This section is to perform a comprehensive investigation of the fuel system 
functions, and to find out the fuel system failure conditions which were classified 
into four hazard class: catastrophic, hazardous, major and minor. The primary 
functions of the fuel system are to store enough fuel required by the mission 
and to supply fuel to the engine and APU at proper rate, pressure and 
temperature under any operating conditions safely and continuously.  
Based on the FHA results, more in-depth analyses such as FMEA could be 
conducted. According to the fuel system functions derived from chapter 3 and 
SAE ARP 4761 [18], a set of FHA tables could be constructed. 
4.1.2 Failure Condition Severity and Effect Classifications 
To evaluate the worst possible effects caused by product malfunction, the 
severity classification of each potential failure mode should be defined. The 
severities of failure condition and effect classifications which are used in this 
thesis are shown in the table below. 
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Table 4-1 Failure Condition Severity and Effect Classifications [19] 
 
4.1.3 Fuel System FHA Summary 
The detail FHA results of the assumed fuel system of FW-11 are shown in 
Appendix B. Since the catastrophic events have great influence to the flight 
safety and system performance, the failure conditions related to these severe 
events are summarised here for the following research. The catastrophic failure 
conditions of the assumed fuel system are shown as Table 4-2. 
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This table shows clearly that the failure of fuel feed subsystem, fuel storage 
subsystem are more serious than other subsystems. Obviously, the research 
should focus on the study of these subsystems, especially the cause of these 
failure conditions. 
Table 4-2 Overview of the Fuel System Severe Failure Condition 
Failure Condition Severity 
Loss of pressurized fuel flow to both engines Catastrophic 
Fuel tank explosion Catastrophic 
Unable to shut off fuel feed flow to a nacelle in event of 
catching fire 
Catastrophic 
Unable to shut off fuel feed to APU in event of catching fire Catastrophic 
4.2 Fuel System FMEA 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The FMEA is an analysis approach, which should be conducted in the early 
design stage to evaluate the design and to provide foundation for the 
establishment of corrective action priorities. FMEA shall documents all possible 
failure in the system, determines the effects of each failure on system operation 
according to the failure mode analysis, identifies the causes of each single 
failure, and ranks the severity of each failure. FMEA is a bottom-up approach 
that traces the effects of crucial component failures through the system [8].  
4.2.2 FMEA Process 
The FMEA is one of the important analysis methods of product security, 
reliability and maintainability plan. This analysis method is used to determine 
the potential effects which each failure had on system security, perform mission, 
system performance, maintainability requirement by analyzing all the possible 
failure modes. Then, to classify every potential failure by its severity in order to 
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acquire the evidence of establishing design, improving process and 
compensating provisions. 
When analyse certain product failure mode, the failure shall be considered as 
the only failure in the system. If a certain mode is undetected, the effects of 
other related failure shall be analysed further because these failures and the 
undetected failure maybe bring on catastrophic or hazardous events. To start 
this process, the engineer defines the system to be analysis. This may be done 
by drawing a scheme diagram that shows how the system shall perform [17]. It 
also includes the function description of each system and various operational 
modes. If more than one method of performing a specific function is supplied, 
the alternative operational modes shall be defined. Simultaneously, the required 
mission time of each function shall be identified, which is developed for 
products to operate in different operational modes during various mission 
phases. 
FMEA normally begins at the component level [17]. The key step of the FMEA 
is to complete the FMEA worksheet. Typically, a FMEA worksheet contains 
several basic elements as follows: 
1. The name of the components being analysed; 
2. A brief description of how they shall function; 
3. A list of the ways in which they can fail; 
4. A description of the effects that these failures have no higher assemblies 
of the system; 
5. Means available for detecting the failure or compensating for the effects 
of the failure; 
6. An assessment of the severity of the failure. 
4.2.3 Fuel System FMEA Summary 
The FMEA in this thesis is based on the assumed fuel system of FW-11. The 
detail result of FMEA for each component is listed in Appendix C. 
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4.3 Fuel System FTA 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The FTA for the fuel system of FW-11 is discussed in the following sections. 
FTA is a top-down approach in which undesirable events are studied to 
determine all possible causes of that event [8]. It focuses on a particular 
unexpected top event and provides a method to identify the causes of this event. 
The FTA is depended on the FHA and FMEA results. It should include all the 
failure modes and events which contribute to the failure condition instead of 
only focusing on the fuel system. 
Since the FW-11 is in the conceptual design stage, the failure rate and mission 
time cannot be clarified or confirmed, the probability of basic and top event is 
not included in this thesis. 
4.3.2 FTA Symbols 
A set of symbols are used in the FTA to provide visual representation of the 
causes and combinations of causes that lead to the top event. The symbols are 
defined below. 
Table 4-3 FTA Logic Symbol 
Symbol Name Description 
 
Event Including top event and intermediate event 
 
Basic event Event which requires no further development 
 
AND-gate Event occurs only if all next lower events occur 
 
OR-gate Event occurs if any next lower event occurs 
 
Transfer To connect the inputs and outputs of related fault trees 
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4.3.3 Fuel System FTA Results 
The detail FTA results of the catastrophic failure conditions are shown below. 
 
Figure 4-1 Unable to Shut off Fuel Feed to a engine While Catching Fire 
 
Figure 4-2 Unable to Shut off Fuel Feed to APU While Catching Fire 
 48 
 
Figure 4-3 Loss of pressurized fuel flow to both engines 
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Figure 4-4 Fuel Tank Explosion 
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4.4 Conclusions 
FHA analyses the functional hazard at the system level. On the contrary, FMEA 
determines the failure modes, effects and severity of each component. Based 
on the combination of FHA and FMEA, the key parameters and crucial 
components which have great impacts to the performance of fuel system can be 
identified. The detail information of required parameters and components are 
shown as the following tables. 
Table 4-4 FHA and FMEA Results Summary 
Failure condition 
Loss of pressurized fuel flow to both engines 
Severity Related component Failure detect method(s) 
Catastrophic AC boost pump 
AC boost pump pressure switch 
Engine FEDAC 
Fuel temperature sensor and water 
detector 
Parameters 
Fuel flow pressure and rate, electrical power signal, fuel 
temperature and water signal 
Failure condition 
Fuel tank explosion 
Severity Related component Failure detect method(s) 
Catastrophic 
OBIGGS 
Flame arrestor 
Heat exchanger 
Fuel temperature monitoring 
Fuel pumps monitoring 
Parameters Fuel temperature, oxygen ratio 
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Table 4-4 FHA and FMEA Results Summary (Cont.) 
Failure condition 
Unable to shut off fuel feed flow to a nacelle in event of catching fire 
Severity Related component Failure detect method(s) 
Catastrophic Engine feed Shutoff 
Valve 
FMC 
Engine FEDAC 
Parameters Valve status signal, fuel flow rate 
Failure condition 
Unable to shut off fuel feed flow to APU in event of catching fire 
Severity Related component Failure detect method(s) 
Catastrophic 
APU feed Shutoff 
Valve 
FMC 
Engine FEDAC 
Parameters Valve status signal, fuel flow rate 
 
  
 52 
5 Fuel Temperature Study 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter illustrates the motivation of the case study. According to the FTA 
results, there are two failure conditions of which the severity level are 
catastrophic, loss of pressurized fuel flow to both engines and fuel tank 
explosion, could be caused by one important parameter – the fuel temperature. 
The fuel temperature has great impact on the flight safety. Low temperature will 
cause ice formation and wax crystals, which will block the fuel-feed inlets and 
reduce the pressure of fuel flow pressurized by the fuel pump due to the 
increase of viscosity respectively. High fuel temperature will increase the risk of 
fuel tank explosion caused by the fuel auto ignition or electric spark.  
The table 5-1 below shows the typical characteristics of Jet A-1, which is the 
most typical and widely used jet fuel in the world except the USA, where Jet A is 
used.  
Table 5-1 Typical JET A-1 Characteristics 
 Jet A-1 
Flash point 38℃ 
Auto-ignition temperature 210℃ 
Freezing point -47℃ (-40℃ for Jet A) 
5.2 Cold Fuel Hazards 
During flight, the fuel temperature in the tanks decreases, due to the low 
temperature of outer atmosphere, especially for the long range civil aircraft. The 
decrease cause the water dissolves from the fuel and the separated water 
accumulates at the bottom of the tank, as it is denser than the fuel.  The water 
will freeze when the fuel temperature drops below its freezing point and may 
block the fuel inlets. It is confirmed that the Boeing 777 accident (British Airways) 
at Heathrow airport was caused by the ice formation in the engine fuel feed inlet. 
The separated water also provides breeding ground for the bacteria which can 
cause the erosion of structure and components in the fuel tank. In order to solve 
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the water accumulation, the scavenge jet pumps are used to mix the separated 
water within fuel, and then the mixed fuel will be feed to the engine for 
combustion. 
Another hazard caused by the low fuel temperature is the wax crystals when the 
fuel is near the freezing point. Aircraft fuel is a complex mixture of different 
hydro-carbons that do not all solidify at the same temperature. When fuel is 
cooled, an increasing proportion of wax crystals form in the fuel as certain of the 
constituents begin to freeze. The wax crystals may block fuel feed lines and 
lead to the engine power fluctuations, power loss and even flame out since the 
insufficient fuel feed to the engine [20]. The figure 5-1 below shows the fuel 
temperature changes during a flight of B747, of which the maximum fuel 
capacity is about 180,000 kg. To solve this problem, the heat exchangers are 
usually used in the fuel tank, commonly installed in the collector fuel tank. 
These heat exchangers exchange heat between fuel and other aircraft systems 
which will be discussed later. 
 
Figure 5-1 The Fuel Temperature Trends of B747 [21] 
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5.3 Hot Fuel Hazards 
Since the TWA flight 800 accident in July 1996, there is great concern in the 
fuel tank explosion suppression of the civil airliners. After four years 
investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded the 
result of accident is the explosion of flammable fuel/air vapours in the fuel tank 
[22]. 
Four primary factors can cause the ignition of fuel vapours within the aircraft 
fuel tank: electrical arcs, filament heating, friction sparks, and auto-ignition. The 
conditions which can ignite fuel/air vapours vary with pressures and 
temperatures within the fuel tank. The sloshing and spraying of fuel can also 
influence the condition. It is very difficult to predict the fuel tank flammability, 
therefore, the fuel air mixture in the aircraft fuel tanks is always considered as 
flammable vapour which ignition sources are restricted strictly [23]. 
In order to suppress the fuel tank explosion, the fuel tank inerting system was 
developed to protect the fuel tank. Normally the upper fuel tank space 
comprises fuel-enriched vapour of which oxygen ratio takes about 20%. This 
provides an explosive condition whilst a heat source or spark is occurred. The 
inerting system use nitrogen-enriched air to inert the fuel tank to eliminate the 
explosive condition by reduce the oxygen ratio to less than 12%. The nitrogen-
enriched air is generated by the OBIGGS. Figure 5-2 shows the principles of 
typical fuel tank inerting system. 
Although the inerting system can eliminate the threat of flammable vapour, the 
system cannot always work properly. There are also some cases the inerting 
system cannot maintains the low oxygen percentage in the fuel-enriched vapour 
such as the rapid descent of aircraft. To make sure the fuel temperature is in a 
relative low value during the mission is still a good solution. 
The aircraft generates lots of heat, particularly from the hydraulic, environmental 
control system (ECS) and even the inerting system. For the supersonic aircraft, 
the aerodynamic heating plays an important role to the fuel tank. All the heat 
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mentioned above needs to be absorbed by the fuel which can be used as heat 
sinks. This will cause the fuel temperature rise.  
 
Figure 5-2 The Principles of Typical Fuel Tank Inerting System [20] 
5.4 Conclusions 
As stated above, both cold fuel and hot fuel are hazardous to the flight safety. 
Thus, to maintain the fuel temperature within a reasonable range is very 
important. For the modern large civil aircraft, the fuel capacity is very high. Once 
the temperature approached the danger point, several hours were needed to 
recover it. Therefore, the fuel temperature should be monitored and predicted 
strictly during flight. The fuel temperature is measured and monitored on the 
modern aircraft, once it reached the threshold point, an alert message will be 
displayed on the EICAS or ECAM. However, few aircraft employ the onboard 
fuel temperature prediction function.  
In conclusion, the fuel temperature diagnosis and prognosis are essential to the 
fuel PHM system to increase the aircraft safety and reliability. 
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6 Fuel Temperature PHM Research 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is to develop an onboard fuel temperature PHM architecture which 
is suitable for the fuel system of FW-11. As stated earlier, rule-based expert 
system and model-based reasoning system are chosen to perform the 
diagnostic function. The prognostic function is achieved through Data-driven 
model-based approach. 
6.2 Fuel Temperature PHM Architecture 
The figure below illustrates the fuel temperature PHM architecture and its 
operating process of monitoring, diagnostics and prognostics. This PHM system 
provides three functions: monitoring, prognosis and diagnosis. 
The first function is to monitor the fuel temperature in each tank and associated 
parameters such as the status of AC boost pumps and valves, fuel quantity data 
in each tank, fuel consumption rate to the engine and the outer temperature. If 
the fuel temperature approached the danger point, an alert message of “low fuel 
temperature” or “high fuel temperature” will be displayed in the EICAS. 
Based on the initial fuel temperature in each tank and operating status of 
associated components provided by the monitoring function, the expected fuel 
temperature in each tank can be calculated by the fuel temperature prediction 
model. The nominal performance data of these associated components are 
stored in this model to support the calculation of fuel temperature expectation. 
These data can be obtained from either calculation or experiments.  
A comparison will be conducted between the actual fuel temperature and the 
expectation. If the disagreement of these two parameters exceeded the 
predefined range, an analysis process will be conducted to find and determine 
the reason for this discrepancy. This discrepancy can be considered as the 
trigger of the analysis process. It also can be used as the criterion of failure 
determination while combining with other parameters. 
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The prognostic function is used to forecast the fuel temperature trends in each 
fuel tank, especially the temperature trends in the collector tanks. By using the 
data from monitoring function, the occurrence time of the fuel temperature 
reaching the dangerous point can be predicted. This forecast will be displayed 
in the EICAS as a caution message to advise the pilot to fly lower or faster if 
necessary. 
 
Figure 6-1 Fuel Temperature PHM Architecture 
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6.3 Fuel Temperature Monitoring Research 
The fuel temperature monitoring function is mainly used to monitor the fuel 
temperature in each tank. A fuel temperature sensor is installed in each fuel 
tank to gauge the temperature and transfer the signal to the FMC. Once the fuel 
temperature approached the danger point, an alert message of “low fuel 
temperature” or “high fuel temperature” will be displayed in the EICAS to alert 
the pilots. 
This function also monitors the relevant components status and parameters for 
the diagnosis and prognosis functions. The fuel quantity in each fuel tank is 
measured and monitored by a set of fuel quantity probes and fuel densitometers 
located in the fuel tanks. The fuel consumption rate to both engines is also 
acquired by the monitoring function. 
The operating condition of AC boost pumps are monitored by the pressure 
switch mounted in the outlet of each fuel pump. The monitoring function also 
monitors the working status of shutoff valves in the fuel feed lines and fuel 
transfer lines.  These components operating status are sent to the FMC for the 
following functions. There are water detectors at the fuel tanks sump area to 
detect water contamination. 
There is a fuel temperature detector emerged in the lower wing structure of 
aircraft to monitor the temperature of outer atmosphere. This temperature has 
taken the aerodynamic heating of the lower wing surface and solar heating 
reflection when the aircraft is on the ground into consideration. Similarly, there 
is a fuel temperature detector emerged in the upper wing structure of aircraft to 
monitor the temperature of upper wing skin. This temperature has taken the 
aerodynamic heating of the upper wing surface and solar heating into 
consideration.  The temperature of upper and lower wing skin can be obtained 
from these two detectors by multiply an experimental coefficient. 
The temperature of the working fluid in the heat exchanger is also monitored by 
this function. This parameter gives alert message to the ECIAS and provides 
data to the fuel temperature prediction model in the FMC. 
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6.4 Fuel Temperature Diagnosis Research 
This section is to discuss the fuel temperature associated diagnostic function in 
which rule-based expert system and model-based reasoning system are 
implemented. 
6.4.1 Rule-based Expert System 
The rule-based expert system is a fast and reliable diagnostic method which 
widely used for failure detection and diagnostic decision making. This system 
mainly utilizes “if-then-else” principle to describe the rule statements. These rule 
statements are the primary contents related to domain knowledge. Generally, 
this expert system comprises five primary functional blocks which are 
knowledge base, reasoning engine, data base, explanatory interface and 
knowledge acquisition [19]. The relationships between these five functional 
blocks are shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 6-2 Rule-based Expert System Schematic Diagram [19] 
The knowledge base is mainly used to store and manage the relevant domain 
expert knowledge. Data base is a special place for expert system to store the 
current system operational data which include the real-time system operating 
status, the inputs from customers and interim results of inferring process. 
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The explanatory interface is to provide description of any problems from 
customers. Reasoning engine contains a set of computer programme to 
determine the selection of the related knowledge from knowledge base and 
infer the evidences from customers to provide the final decision for the specific 
problems. The knowledge acquisition is used to transform the engineering 
experts’ knowledge into computer programme to establish the knowledge base. 
The core of rule-based expert system is domain expert knowledge which is the 
foundation of diagnostic decision making. Typically, this domain expert 
knowledge can be obtained from system operational principle, operational 
experiences, and FTA. FTA has become a very important analysis tool for 
providing the source of domain expert knowledge. The FTA results of 
unexpected fuel temperature changes in collector tank are shown in the figures 
below. 
 
Figure 6-3 Unexpected Fuel Temperature Raise in Collector Tank 
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Figure 6-4 Unexpected Fuel Temperature Decrease in Collector Tank 
6.4.2 Model-based Reasoning System 
In the fuel system of FW-11, the mechanical components associated with the 
fuel temperature include suction feed inlet screens, suction feed check valves, 
scavenge ejector pumps, engine feed check valves and flapper check valves. 
The status of these components cannot be monitored by the FMC. For the 
mechanical components which have no sensed data, the model-based 
reasoning system is a good choice for the diagnostic technique. The working 
process of this diagnostic technique is shown in figure 6-5. 
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Figure 6-5 Working Process of Fuel Temperature Diagnosis 
In the first step, the fuel temperature prediction model calculates the expected 
fuel temperature based on the inputs which include the initial fuel temperature 
and fuel quantity in each fuel tank, operating commands from the cockpit and 
FMC, real-time engine fuel consumption rate and temperature in the lower 
structure provided by the monitoring function. This fuel temperature prediction 
model works in the same inputs as the real condition to provide the nominal 
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output. This model assumes all the relevant components are working in the 
normal condition or responding the commands correctly. 
In the second step, a comparison between the nominal fuel temperature and the 
real data is conducted. If these two parameters are discrepant, it will trigger the 
failure detection process. 
Finally, the physical system matches the built-in model to determine the cause 
of this discrepancy or identify the locations of failed mechanical components. 
6.5 Fuel Temperature Prognosis Research 
As mentioned in the literature review, Boeing and Airbus have developed 
programme to forecast the fuel temperature trends in each fuel tank during the 
mission. However, this software cannot provide the real-time temperature 
prediction. It can only predict the fuel temperature changes in the normal 
operation. Another drawback of this software is that it relies on the weather 
forecast, which will influence the accuracy of prediction result. Therefore, the 
onboard fuel temperature prognostic system is necessary. 
In this section, an onboard fuel temperature prognostic architecture will be 
established to forecast the remaining time for the hazard fuel temperature 
approaching. The data-driven model-based approach is used to achieve this 
target. 
6.5.1 Fuel Temperature Prediction Model 
For a fixed aircraft fuel system, the rate at which the fuel temperature changes 
is a function of air temperature, heat from heat exchangers, specific heat 
capacity, the inlet fuel flow rate, the outlet fuel flow rate, the inlet fuel 
temperature, the fuel mass within the fuel tank, the fuel temperature in the fuel 
tank and time. Figure 6-6 shows the heat transfer mechanism of a typical fuel 
tank. 
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Figure 6-6 Heat Transfer Mechanism 
The fuel tank can be considered as an open system undergoing a nonsteady-
flow process. The fuel/air vapour in the upper space is assumed to be heat 
insulated. Another assumption is the fuel enter into the fuel tank can be mixed 
with the original fuel equally instantly, all the fuel in the fuel tank is in the same 
temperature T.  According to the thermodynamic theory, the change of internal 
energy (dU) in the fuel tank can be expressed as equation 6-1. 
ܷ݀ = ݀ ௜ܷ௡௟௘௧ − ܷ݀௢௨௧௟௘௧ + ߜܳ − ߜܹ 
Where ݀ ௜ܷ௡௟௘௧ is the internal energy enters into the fuel tank; ܷ݀௢௨௧௟௘௧ is 
the internal energy leaves the fuel tank; ߜܳ  is the heat exchange 
between fuel and surrounding structures or components. It contains the 
following heat source: heating from the heat exchanger ܳுா , 
(6-1)
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aerodynamic heating to the upper and lower wing skin, heat emission 
from the lower skin ܳ௟௢௪௘௥, heat emission from the upper skin ܳ௨௣௣௘௥ , 
heat exchange with the ribs and spars surrounding the fuel ܳ௥௜௕ , solar 
heating and solar reflection heating when the aircraft is on the ground;  
ߜܹ is the output work of the fuel tank. 
Assuming the kinetic energy of the fuel flow will not convert to heat, all 
the fuel tanks of the aircraft are in the same fuel level, it means that the 
kinetic and potential energy is ignored. Then the following equation can 
be gotten: 
ܷ݀
݀ݐ = ߜܳ + ܿ௣ ∙ ሶ݉ ௜௡௟௘௧ ∙ ௜ܶ௡௟௘௧ − ܿ௣ ∙ ሶ݉ ௢௨௧௟௘௧ ∙ ௢ܶ௨௧௟௘௧
(6-2)
Where ܿ௣ is the specific heat capacity which varies with the fuel temperature; 
ሶ݉ ௜௡௟௘௧ and ሶ݉ ௢௨௧௟௘௧ is the fuel flow rate enter or leave the fuel tank respectively; 
௜ܶ௡௟௘௧  and ௢ܶ௨௧௟௘௧  is the temperature of fuel enter or leave the fuel tank 
respectively. 
From the definition of specific heat capacity, the formula below can be gotten: 
ܷ݀
݀ݐ =
݀൫ܿ௣݉ܶ൯
݀ݐ = ܿ௣݉
݀ܶ
݀ݐ + ܿ௣ܶ
݀݉
݀ݐ  
(6-3)
ܷ݀
݀ݐ = ܿ௣݉
݀ܶ
݀ݐ + ܿ௣ܶ( ሶ݉ ௜௡௟௘௧ − ሶ݉ ௢௨௧௟௘௧) 
(6-4)
Combine the equation 6-2 and 6-4, and let  ௢ܶ௨௧௟௘௧ = ܶ , then: 
݀ܶ
݀ݐ =
ߜܳ + ܿ௣ ሶ݉ ௜௡௟௘௧( ௜ܶ௡௟௘௧ − ܶ)
ܿ௣݉  
(6-5)
Or 
௜ܶାଵ =
ߜܳ + ܿ௣ ሶ݉ ௜௡௟௘௧( ௜ܶ௡௟௘௧ − ௜ܶ)
ܿ௣݉௜ ∆ݐ + ௜ܶ 
(6-6)
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Based on the equation 6-5 or 6-6, a fuel temperature prediction model can be 
constructed. A prediction model constructed in the Simulink is shown as an 
example in the figure below. 
 
Figure 6-7 Fuel Temperature Prediction Model based on Simulink 
6.5.2 Fuel Temperature Prognostic Architecture 
The fuel temperature prognosis predicts the occurrence time of the dangerous 
fuel temperature approaching. The working process of this fuel temperature 
prognostic technique is shown in figure 6-8. 
First, the fuel temperature prediction model receives the current temperature in 
each fuel tank as the initial parameter from the monitoring function. The 
associated components status, fuel quantity data in each tank, engine fuel 
consumption rate and temperature in the lower and upper wing skin are also 
transmitted to the prediction model. 
Based on this data, an integrating process will be conducted to determine the 
occurrence time of dangerous fuel temperature for the following comparison to 
the remaining mission time. A caution message will be sent to the EICAS to 
alert the pilots if the occurrence time is less than the remaining mission time. 
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Figure 6-8 Fuel Temperature Prognosis 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the fuel temperature PHM architecture was established for the 
fuel system to perform the monitoring, diagnosis and prognosis functions so as 
to increase the safety and reliability of FW-11. 
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7 Conclusions and Future Work 
7.1 Conclusions 
The target of this thesis was to implement the PHM technology to the fuel 
system of FW-11 to make sure the successful civil aviation market. The FW-11 
is the group design project which the author participated. The detail information 
of the GDP is shown in Appendix A. 
PHM system on board the aircraft enables the real-time transformation of 
system status data into alert and maintenance information during all ground or 
flight operating phases, which can support pilots and ground maintenance crew 
making decision. The fuel system PHM will increase the competitive capability 
of FW-11. 
The research started with the literature review which illustrated the roadmap, 
current application and the challenges of PHM system. It also introduced the 
primary functions and the technologies of PHM system. The fuel temperature 
prediction development was also included in this review. 
After the literature review, an assumed fuel system of FW-11 was established 
firstly according to the conceptual design results. This assumed fuel system met 
the airworthiness regulation requirements such as FAA, EASA and CAAC. All 
research efforts in this thesis were based on this assumed fuel system 
architecture. This fuel system stores enough fuel required by the mission and to 
supply fuel to the engine and APU at proper rate, pressure and temperature 
under any operating conditions safely and continuously. This fuel system 
controls the fuel consumption order to maintain the CG of aircraft as forward as 
possible since the weak static stability. The inerting subsystem was deployed in 
this fuel system to reduce the risks of fuel tank explosion. There are heat 
exchangers installed in the fuel collector tanks to sink the heat from inerting 
subsystem and hydraulic system.  
In order to identify all failure conditions which the system may cause, a FHA 
was conducted for the fuel system of FW-11. The FHA provided a starting point 
for the following more in-depth FMEA and FTA. The FHA and FMEA results 
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showed that the failure of fuel feed subsystem, fuel storage subsystem are 
more serious than other subsystems. Based on these results, FTA was 
conducted to find the probable causes of four catastrophic failure conditions. 
According to the FTA results, the fuel temperature was selected as the case 
study of this thesis. The hazards of cold fuel and hot fuel were investigated to 
illustrate the essentiality of fuel temperature diagnosis and prognosis. 
Finally, the fuel temperature PHM architecture was established for the fuel 
system PHM technology development. The rule-based expert system and 
model-based reasoning system are chosen to perform the diagnostic function. 
In order to obtain the domain expert knowledge, the FTA of unexpected fuel 
temperature changes in the collector tanks was conducted. For the prognostic 
function, it is achieved through Data-driven model-based approach. A proposal 
fuel temperature prediction method was also derived from the thermodynamic 
analysis of the typical fuel tank. 
To sum up, the above research works provided a new concept for the fuel 
system PHM development. Based on the FHA, FMEA and FTA results, the fuel 
temperature was chosen to perform the PHM functions which include 
monitoring/detection, diagnostics and prognostics. A comprehensive PHM 
architecture of fuel temperature was established. This architecture will increase 
the aircraft safety and reliability dramatically. The research objectives of this 
thesis were fully achieved. 
7.2 Future Work 
As stated earlier, the PHM system covers lots of complex concepts, tools, 
approaches, techniques and technologies. This thesis was only to stand at the 
system level to implement the real-time monitoring, diagnostics and prognostics 
of fuel temperature. In order to meet the entire research objectives of the 
aircraft fuel system PHM, the research work should be extended to a broader 
range instead of only focusing on one component, parameter, or subsystem. 
More inside failure modes of components and relevant parameters should be 
investigated to enhance the monitoring capability. For the fuel temperature 
 70 
diagnostic function, more in-depth FTA should be conducted to increase the 
accuracy of failure diagnosis. As for the fuel temperature prognostics, more 
accurate fuel temperature prediction model needs to be developed before the 
practical implement of PHM system. 
Since the insufficient components and system data for the quantitative analysis 
in the conceptual design stage, this thesis only focused on the qualitative 
prognostic research. An accurate simulation of the temperature prediction 
model needs to be conducted to verify this model in the detail design stage. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Group Design Project 
A.1 Introduction 
A.1.1 Background 
This part gives a brief description of the background of Group Design Project 
(GDP) the author took part in. The GDP title is Flying Wing Civil Airliner, and the 
abbreviation is FW-11. 
FW-11 is a three-year collaborative civil aircraft project between AVIC and 
Cranfield University. The major target of this project is to develop a novel and 
unique commercial flying wing aircraft of which seating capacity is from 150 to 
250 proposed by AVIC. 
FW-11 is an innovative 250-seat long range airliner, which is aimed at 
international civil aviation market, focusing on Asia-Pacific Region, Europe and 
North American primarily. The primary competitor for FW-11 is B787-8, in order 
to win the competition, the FW-11 need to achieve the following targets: more 
comfortable, lower life cycle cost and environmental friendly compared with 
B787-8 and existing civil airliners.  Benefited from the aerodynamics of flying 
wing configuration, FW-11 has great advantages on the fuel efficiency since the 
drag during cruise is much smaller than the conventional aircraft. 
The whole design process of FW-11 was divided into three stages: conceptual 
design, preliminary design and detail design. From 2011 to 2013, about 20 
delegates from AVIC will be involved each year to participate in each stage. The 
year, 2011, is the first year of FW-11 project and 23 delegates and a tutor from 
AVIC were in the project. The conceptual design lasts about six months from 
April to September.  
In the conceptual design stage, the target market was identified, and then a set 
of key parameters such as size and range were determined, finally, the 
configuration of FW-11 was decided. All the results above will be organized in 
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the aircraft specification and delivered to the next stage as the top level design 
inputs. 
A.1.2 Design Process 
The conceptual design process was divided into three phase:  
1. Phase Ⅰ: Derivation of Requirements. 
2. Phase Ⅱ: To design a conventional aircraft as baseline. 
3. Phase Ⅲ: To design the FW-11 and comparing with baseline aircraft. 
A.1.2.1 Phase Ⅰ 
During Phase Ⅰ, in order to get the design requirements of the FW-11 for the 
next two phases, the members were divided into six teams: Market, 
Manufacturer and Operator Data and Model, Aerodynamic, Geometry, 
Performance. A comprehensive survey of current civil aviation industry was 
carried on. A data base was built by collecting data from Airbus and Boeing, 
and then various methods were employed to check the validation of the data, 
the involved aircrafts include B737, B757, B767, B777, B787, A320, A321, 
A340 and A330. In this phase, the author was in charge of the market analysis 
and derived the requirements of FW-11 which will be discussed in the market 
analysis part. 
A.1.2.2 Phase Ⅱ 
In the second phase, the members were allocated into six teams which include 
Geometry, Aerodynamic, Engine Sizing, Cabin layout, Mass and Landing Gear, 
Performance. Based on the requirements derived from the first phase, a 
conventional aircraft was designed as a baseline aircraft. The author was in the 
performance team, and primarily in charge of the cruising performance 
calculation. 
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A.1.2.3 Phase Ⅲ 
During the third phase, seven teams worked together to accomplish the design 
of FW-11. Besides the six teams in the Phase Ⅱ, the structure team was 
assigned to enable further development of conceptual design. The design 
process of FW-11 is shown as Figure A-1. 
 
Figure A-1 Design Process of FW-11 in Phase Ⅲ 
A.2 Market Analysis 
At the beginning of the Flying Wing design process, the inputs for the design 
should be customer needs. The requirements and design drivers for FW-11 can 
be identified from the market analysis. 
The market analysis includes market outlook, target market, customer 
requirements investigation, family issues, and of course, entry service time. 
A.2.1 Market Outlook 
The air traffic growth relies on several factors including economic growth, fuel 
price changes, airline productivity gains, environmental issues and airports. 
A.2.1.1 World Economy Trends 
Recently revised data shows that in 2009 the World gross domestic product 
(GDP) contracted 1.9%. The world economy experienced the steepest global 
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recession since the Great Depression. However, the global economy 
rebounded in 2010, with estimated growth rate 3.9% [26]. Figure A-2 shows the 
economic growth from 2000 to 2010 in term of GDP. 
 
Figure A-2 Development in World GDP 2000-2010 [26] 
According to the forecast by Boeing Company, the prediction of world economy 
growth rate is 3.2% from 2009 to 2029 annually, shown as Figure A-3. 
 
Figure A-3 World Economic Growth [27] 
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A.2.1.2 World Air Traffic Trends 
According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the world air 
traffic is expected to grow at 4% annually in term of Revenue passenger 
kilometres (RPK), shown as Figure A-4. 
 
Figure A-4 ICAO Passenger Traffic Forecasts [28] 
A.2.1.3 Industry Outlook 
Airbus Outlook 
Airbus predicts in its Global Market Forecast 2010-2029 that during the period 
from 2010 to 2029, global passenger traffic is expected to increase by 4.8% 
annually, shown as Figure A-5 [29]. In this report, Airbus also predicts that the 
Asia-Pacific airlines will lead world traffic by 2029, shown as Figure A-6 [29]. 
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Figure A-5 World Annual Traffic Forecast [29] 
 
Figure A-6 2009 and 2029 Traffic Volume per Airline Domicile Region [29] 
It is predicted that 25,800 new aircraft will be delivered to airlines and the 
market value will be $3.2 trillion. Among the new aircrafts, 17,870 aircrafts are 
single-aisle, however, twin-aisle aircrafts share 42% value, which is the largest 
portion of the new aircrafts shown as Figure A-7 [29]. 
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Figure A-7 20-year New Deliveries of Passenger and Freighter Aircraft [29] 
Boeing Outlook 
According to Boeing Global Market Forecast 2011-2030, the long-term growth 
rate of aviation industry will be approximately 5 percent per year shown as 
Figure A-8 [30]. 
 
Figure A-8 Market Growth Rates [30] 
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In the next 20 years, 7,330 new twin-aisle aircrafts are predicted to deliver into 
the market (Table A-1). This represents 22 percent of total deliveries (Figure A-
9), or 43 percent of total market value (Figure A-10).  
 
Figure A-9 Market Value in the World [30] 
 
Figure A-10 Market Value in the World [30] 
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Table A-1 The New Delivery Aircrafts and Value Forecast [30] 
 
COMAC Outlook 
In order to develop China’s own civil aircraft industry, in February 2008, the 
large aircraft project was approved by Chinese government, and Commercial 
Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) had been established to develop this 
project. 
COMAC predicts that the growth rate of air traffic during the next 20 years 
(2009-2029) will increase 5.2% annually. From 2009 to 2029, 30230 new 
aircrafts will be delivered into the global market, it values 3,396 billion dollars. 
Among them, 6047 new small and medium twin-aisle aircrafts will enter into the 
market and the value is 1,379 billion dollars, which is about 40% of the overall 
market value, shown as Table 4-2 [31]. 
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Table A-2 The New Delivery Aircrafts and Value Forecast [31] 
Airplane delivery between 2009 and 2029 
  
 Global China 
seats
New 
aircraft 
deliveries
Value  New 
aircraft 
deliveries 
Value  
(Billion 
dollar) 
(Billion 
dollar) 
Turbofan regional jet 
50 141 3.5 9 0.2 
70 807 29 72 2.6 
90 2,445 101 606 24.4 
Single jet 
120 3840 251.1 389 25.5 
160 13723 1,111.50 2,204 178.5 
200 2358 217.9 357 33.2 
Dual jet 
250 4592 968.8 559 118.6 
350 1455 410.9 163 45.9 
400 869 302.6 80 27.9 
Total  30230 3,396.30 4,439 456.8 
National Strategy of China 
In order to reduce the risk, China should develop its large civil aircraft industry 
step by step, to divide the whole progress into 4 stages (Figure A-11). To 
accordant with this strategy, the flying wing aircraft should accommodate 250 
passengers and have the capability to convert to 350 seats aircraft. 
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Figure A-11 Strategy of China’s Civil Aviation Industry 
Conclusion 
From the market outlook of ICAO, Airbus, Boeing and Comac, the conclusion is 
clear: In the long term, world economy is expected to grow at 3.2% per annum 
and the global traffic will continue to increase in terms of passenger and freight 
air transport. Among the commercial aircraft demand for the next two decades, 
small and medium twin-aisle aircraft which can accommodate 250 to 350 
passengers have more than 40% market share. Take China’s strategy of 
developing large civil aircraft into consideration, the FW-11 should focus on the 
small and medium twin-aisle aircraft. 
A.2.2 Target Market 
From the market analysis above, the new FW-11 will focus on the global market, 
and the primary target markets should be the Asia pacific region, Europe and 
North American. 
A.2.3 Requirements 
Requirements include general requirements, seating capacity, range, speed, 
field performance, cost, operating and development requirements. 
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A.2.3.1 General Requirements 
In order to focus on the global market, the FW-11 must meet the airworthiness 
regulations of CAAC (Civil Aviation Administration of China), FAR and EASA. 
A.2.3.2 Seating Capacity 
As described above, the seating capacity of FW-11 is 250 seats (single class 
cabin), and it should have the capability to convert to 350 seats version while 
considering the family issue. 
A.2.3.3 Range Requirement 
The principle for the FW-11 range should cover any region pair of the three 
regions: Asia-Pacific Region, Europe and North American. Thus 7,500 nautical 
miles is essential for the range requirement.  Figure A-12, Figure A-13 and 
Figure A-14 show the coverage of 7500 nm fly from Beijing, London and New 
York respectively. 
 
Figure A-12 7500 nm Range Coverage from Beijing 
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Figure A-13 7500 nm Range Coverage from London 
 
Figure A-14 7500 nm Range Coverage from New York 
A.2.3.4 Speed Requirement 
The aircraft being developed is in the same class with the existing Boeing B767-
200ER, B787-8, Airbus A330-200. The speed of B767-200 is M0.80; A330-200 
cruises at M0.82; The Mach number of B787-8 is M0.85. Thus, the speed from 
M0.80 to M0.85 is reasonable. 
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A.2.3.5 Field Performance Requirement 
Both A330-200 and B787-8 are taking-off and landing at 4E airports, as their 
wing spans are about 60 metres, larger than 52 metres. In order to make sure 
FW-11 can win the competition, the minimum field performance requirement for 
FW-11 should be taking-off and landing in the 4E airports. 
A.2.3.6 Cost and Operating Requirement 
The unit cost of B787, the primary competitor of FW-11, are 185 million US 
dollars, the FW-11 should not beyond this value. Thus, the unit cost of FW-11 
should less than 185 million US dollars and the Operating Empty Weight should 
less than 110,000 kg, shown as Figure A-15. 
 
Figure A-15 List Unit Cost Statistics 
The FW-11 should be designed to reduce the life cycle cost largely, thus it must 
improve the fuel efficiency by at least 25% of the existing in service aircraft such 
as A330-200, since Boeing declaim that B787 can burn 20% less fuel than the 
similar class aircrafts. 
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A.2.3.7 Noise 
From the noise reduction expectation from ICAO, the FW-11 should reduce the 
noise about 20.5dB at least, shown as Figure A-16. 
 
Figure A-16 Noise Reduction Targets [28] 
A.2.3.8 Further Development 
As discussed above, the FW-11 should have the capability to accommodate 
350 passengers whilst take family issue into consideration. 
The FW-11 also should have the potential to convert to cargo aircraft, in another 
word, it should have freighter variant. The passenger aircraft can be convert to 
freighter whilst approaching the end of life to reduce the risks. 
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A.2.3.9 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the requirements for FW-11 are shown as Table A-3. 
Table A-3 Requirements for FW-11 
General Requirements CCAR, FAR, EASA-CS 
Seating Capacity 250 to 350 seats (single class) 
Design Range 7500nm 
Cruise Speed M0.80-0.85 
Field Performance Taking-off and Landing at 4E airport 
Cost  Unit price less than $185 million 
Operating Cost 25% fuel reduction compared with A330-200 
Noise Reduction 20.5 dB noise reduction 
Further development Flexible operating capabilities 
Entry Service Time 2020 
A.3 Cruising Performance Calculation 
The cruising stage is usually the flight phase which most of the fuel is burned, 
thus the cruising performance is extremely crucial in considering an aircraft’s 
performance, especially for the civil aircraft which fuel cost takes about 30% of 
the total operating cost. 
According to AVD course 0603 of SOE in CU, there are three cruise methods to 
calculate the cruising performance:  
1. Constant angle of attack and constant Mach number – known as the 
cruise-climb method, as altitude must increase to allow atmospheric 
pressure to fall as aircraft weight reduces during flight. 
2. Constant angle of attack and constant altitude – true airspeed will be 
reduced to compensate for the reducing aircraft weight during flight. 
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3. Constant altitude and constant Mach number – lift co-efficient is 
decreasing by reduce the angle of attack since the reducing aircraft 
weight.  
Normally the first cruise method enables the aircraft cruise longer range 
compared with the other two methods. However, due to the operational 
restrictions, the third cruise method is the most frequently used method. Thus 
the third cruise method is chosen to calculate the cruising performance of FW-
11. 
The equation for the cruise method 3 is shown as below: 
ܴଷ =
1
݃ ൤
௠ܸௗ௜
ܥ ܧ௠௔௫൨ 2ݑ௜ ൜ܽݐܽ݊
1
ݑ௜ଶ − ܽݐܽ݊
1
߱ݑ௜ଶൠ 
(A-1)
Where ௠ܸௗ௜ is the initial minimum drag speed, ܧ௠௔௫ is the maximum value for 
lift-drag ratio, u is the relative speed and ߱ is the fuel ratio (߱ = W୧ W୤⁄ ). W୧ is 
the initial aircraft weight, W୤ is the final aircraft weight. 
Based on the equation A-1, a spreadsheet was established to calculate the 
range of FW-11 and the baseline aircraft, which is designed for the comparison. 
According to the Advisory Circular AC120-27E, the average weight of each 
passenger is 115.7kg (winter weight), all the aircrafts to be compared are in the 
maximum density. The data is from the aircraft characteristic for airport planning 
documents. The Block performance and payload-range diagram can be gotten, 
shown as Figure A-17 and A-18. 
 
Figure A-17 Block Time and Block Fuel 
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Figure A-18 Payload-Range Diagram 
Table A-4 and Figure A-19 show the fuel efficiency comparison results. The 
FW-11 can save about 30% fuel compared with A330-200 in term of Fuel per 
passengers per nautical miles. 
Table A-4 Cruising Performance Results 
  B767-200ER A330-200 FW-11 Baseline 
seats 255 303 248 220 
weight/pax(kg) 115.7 115.7 115.7 115.7  
MTOW(kg) 175540 233000 176469 185278  
OEW(kg) 82377 109100 75044 78537  
payload(kg) 29496 35048 28686 25447  
Payload&OEW(kg) 111873 144148 103730 103984  
Payload Range(nm) 5600 5656 7772 7721  
fuel capacity(kg) 63667 88852 72739 81294  
Fuel used(kg) 60484 84409 67647 75604  
Fuel/pax/nm(kg) 0.042 0.049 0.035 0.045  
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Figure A-19 Fuel Efficiency Comparison 
A.4 Conclusion of GDP Work 
In the Group Design Project of FW-11, the author collected data from the World 
Bank, ICAO, Airbus, Boeing, COMAC and other sources. Based on the data 
collected, analyzed the requirements of market, and then proposed the 
requirements for the FW-11 design inputs. 
The author was also in charge of the cruising performance calculation during 
the whole design approach of FW-11, calculated the cruising performance for 
the baseline and flying wing aircraft, compared the new designed aircrafts with 
the civil airliners in service. As a fuel system engineer, the author gave 
recommendations about the fuel system, especially the criteria for the fuel tanks. 
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Appendix B Fuel System FHA Summary 
The detail FHA results of the assumed fuel system of FW-11 are shown as the 
following tables. 
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Table B-1 Fuel System FHA Summary 
Function Failure Condition Phase Effect on Aircraft / Crew / Occupants Severity 
To supply fuel to each 
engine with pressurized 
fuel flow 
Loss of pressurized fuel flow 
to both engines 
Takeoff, 
Landing 
Loss of engine thrust and power. 
Both engines may flame out. 
Catastrophic 
Loss of pressurized fuel flow 
to both engines 
Flight 
Loss of engine thrust and power. 
Both engines may flame out. 
Hazardous 
Loss of pressurized fuel flow 
to one engine 
Takeoff, 
Flight 
Landing 
Loss of engine thrust and power. 
One engine may flame out. 
Control trim required due to 
asymmetric thrust. 
Major 
To maintain the safety 
operation of the aircraft in 
all flight phases 
Fuel tank catching on fire or 
even fuel tank explosion 
All Air accident Catastrophic 
To Shut off engine fuel 
feed 
unable to shut off fuel feed 
flow to the nacelle(s) in the 
event of catching on fire 
All 
Loss of ability to isolate engine 
compartment from fuel flow. 
Catastrophic 
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Table B-1 Fuel System FHA Summary (Cont.) 
Function Failure Condition Phase Effect on Aircraft / Crew / Occupants Severity 
To shut off APU fuel feed  
Unable to shut off fuel feed 
flow to the APU in the event 
of catching on fire 
All 
Loss of ability to isolate APU 
compartment from fuel flow. 
Catastrophic 
Correct the fuel 
 imbalance 
Inability to perform cross 
feed function when lateral 
asymmetry occurred. 
Flight 
Loss of ability to eliminate lateral 
imbalance caused by fuel system. 
Control trim or engine thrust 
adjustment required due to lateral 
asymmetry. 
Major 
APU fuel feed 
Loss of pressurized fuel 
supply to APU 
ALL 
Loss of auxiliary power 
Loss of one of the emergency powers 
Major 
To eject fuel to the 
collector tanks 
Loss of motive fuel transfer Flight 
Insufficient fuel transfer to the collector 
tanks. Unusable fuel increased. 
Water accumulation. 
minor 
Fuel tanks vent 
Fuel tanks venting blockage Flight 
Structural damage caused by large 
pressure difference between fuel tanks 
and outer atmosphere while climbing 
or descending 
Hazardous 
Fuel tanks venting blockage Ground 
Inability to accomplish the refuel 
operation. 
May damage the fuel tank structure. 
Major 
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Table B-1 Fuel System FHA Summary (Cont.) 
Function Failure Condition Phase Effect on Aircraft / Crew / Occupants Severity 
To perform the automatic 
pressure refuelling 
Loss of automatic pressure 
refuelling capability 
Ground 
Ground crew can use manual mode. 
Possible dispatch delay. 
Minor 
Inability to sends signals to 
the refuel valve shutoff the 
refuelling flow at the desired 
fuel quantity 
Ground 
Ground crew needs to check the 
validation of fuel indication subsystem. 
No damage to the fuel system. 
Minor 
To indicate the cross 
feed valve position 
Fuel cross feed open 
message inoperative 
Flight 
Lateral imbalance would occur if one or 
more AC boost pumps are failed. 
Minor 
To maintain the fuel 
temperature in an 
appropriate range 
The fuel temperature is 
lower than the freezing point 
or exceeds the designated 
point. 
All 
The fuel feed lines to the engines may 
be blocked. 
High fuel temperature may cause fuel 
tank explosion. 
Catastrophic 
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Table B-1 Fuel System FHA Summary (Cont.) 
Function Failure Condition Phase Effect on Aircraft / Crew / Occupants Severity 
Indicate accurate fuel 
quantity data related to 
the fuel tanks 
Loss of fuel quantity data 
from left or right or centre 
tanks 
Flight 
Crew shall use fuel consumed data to 
derive fuel remaining for failed tank 
displays. 
Minor 
Loss of fuel quantity data 
from all the tanks 
Flight 
Crews can only derive the remaining 
fuel for failed tank displays through the 
fuel consumed data. 
Crews were not aware of the 
malfunction of fuel tank leakage. 
Major 
Loss of fuel quantity data 
from all the tanks and loss 
of fuel low level warning 
Flight 
Crews were not aware of the situation 
of insufficient remaining fuel. 
Hazardous  
Erroneous left or right or 
centre fuel tanks quantity 
data provided to the cockpit 
displays 
Flight 
Crews may unable to recognize the 
invalid data display 
Minor 
Erroneous all fuel tanks 
quantity data provided to the 
cockpit displays 
Flight 
Crews are unable to recognize the 
invalid data display 
Major 
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Table B-1 Fuel System FHA Summary (Cont.) 
Function Failure Condition Phase Effect on Aircraft / Crew / Occupants Severity 
To indicate accurate fuel 
low level of collector 
tanks 
Loss of fuel low level data 
from left or right collector 
tanks 
Flight 
Extra observation of fuel quantity data 
of each tank conducted by the crews is 
needed. 
Minor 
Loss of fuel low level data 
from left and right collector 
tanks 
Flight 
Extra observation of fuel quantity data 
of each tank conducted by the crews is 
needed. 
Major 
Erroneous fuel low level 
indication from one of the 
collector tanks 
Flight 
Crews must determine the validation of 
fuel quantity display. 
Minor 
Erroneous fuel low level 
indication from both 
collector tanks 
Flight 
Crews must determine the validation of 
fuel quantity display. 
Major 
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Table B-1 Fuel System FHA Summary (Cont.) 
Function Failure Condition Phase Effect on Aircraft / Crew / Occupants Severity 
To indicate the fuel 
imbalance 
Imbalance signal appear 
when no fuel tank imbalance 
condition exists. 
Flight 
Crew needs to check the fuel quantity 
data displayed in the display. 
Minor 
No imbalance signal display 
when fuel tank imbalance 
condition exists. 
Flight Control trim needed Minor 
No imbalance signal display 
after single engine shut 
down during flight. 
Flight Control trim needed Minor 
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Appendix C Fuel System FMEA Summary 
The detail FMEA results of the assumed fuel system of FW-11 are shown as the 
following tables. 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary 
Component: AC boost pump 
Component function:  provides pressurized fuel flow to the engines, APU and ejector pumps. 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Loss of fuel flow Loss of associated pump fuel flow Reduced fuel feed flow. Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Low pressure fuel feed Reduced associated pump fuel flow Reduced fuel feed flow. Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Failed to shut down the 
pump when overheated 
Heat the associated fuel tank Possible fuel tank explosion. Hazardous
Ground & 
flight 
Check valve failed to 
close 
When the associated pump is not in 
use, fuel is delivered back the fuel 
tank. 
Reduced fuel feed flow. Possible 
lateral imbalance when cross 
feed was in operation. 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Internal fuel leakage Reduced associated pump fuel flow Reduced fuel feed flow. Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: DC APU pump 
Component function:  provides pressurized fuel to APU 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Loss of fuel flow Loss of associated pump fuel flow Reduced fuel feed flow. Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Low pressure fuel feed Reduced associated pump fuel flow Reduced fuel feed flow. Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Fails to shut down the 
pump when overheated 
Heat the associated fuel tank Possible fuel tank explosion. Hazardous
Ground & 
flight 
Check valve fails to 
close 
When the associated pump is not in 
use, fuel is delivered back the left 
collector tank. 
Reduced fuel feed flow. Possible 
lateral imbalance when cross 
feed was in operation. 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Internal fuel leakage Reduced associated pump fuel flow Reduced fuel feed flow. Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: engine feed shutoff valve 
Component function:  isolate the fuel flow from engine(s) in case of fire or shut off fuel flow when feed line ruptured.  
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open 
Loss of fuel flow in associated 
engine fuel feed line 
Unable to start associated engine Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Fails to close 
Inability to shut off fuel flow in 
associated fuel feed line 
Loss of fuel feed line isolation 
from engine fire or fuel line 
rupture 
Hazardous
Ground & 
flight 
Internal leak 
Inability to shut off fuel flow in 
associated fuel feed line 
Unable to isolate fuel flow from 
engine fire or fuel line rupture. 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
External leak 
Fuel feed line leaks into the outer 
tube 
Ground crew needs to drain the 
associate double wall tube 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Loss of valve position Erroneous shutoff valve indication Caution message generated Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: APU feed shutoff valve 
Component function:  isolate the fuel flow from APU in case of fire or shut off fuel flow when feed line ruptured.  
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open Loss of fuel flow in APU fuel feed line Unable to start APU Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Fails to close 
Inability to shut off fuel flow in APU 
fuel feed line 
Loss of fuel feed line isolation 
from APU fire or fuel line rupture 
Hazardous
Ground & 
flight 
Internal leak 
Inability to shut off fuel flow in APU 
fuel feed line 
Unable to isolate fuel flow from 
APU fire or fuel line rupture 
completely. 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
External leak 
Fuel feed line leaks into the outer 
tube 
Ground crew needs to drain the 
APU double wall tube 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Loss of valve position Erroneous shutoff valve indication Caution message generated Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
 107 
Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: cross feed shutoff valve 
Component function:  isolates the left and right fuel feed lines and provides cross fuel feed when needed. 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open Loss of fuel cross feed function 
Inability to correct lateral 
imbalance in flight. 
Subsequent engine failure will 
aggravate the lateral imbalance. 
Unable to transfer fuel in the right 
tanks to the left tanks in defuel 
operation. 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Fails to close 
Inability to isolate left and right fuel 
feed lines 
Loss of isolation of left and right 
fuel feed lines 
Major Flight 
Internal leak 
Inability to isolate left and right fuel 
feed lines completely 
Partly loss of isolation of left and 
right fuel feed lines 
Major Flight 
 108 
Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: cross feed shutoff valve 
Component function:  isolates the left and right fuel feed lines and provides cross fuel feed when needed. 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
External leak 
Fuel feed line leaks into the Centre 
Tank 
Reduced fuel feed flow. 
Increased unusable fuel. 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Loss of valve position 
Erroneous cross feed shutoff valve 
indication 
Caution message generated Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: Suction feed inlet screen 
Component function:  filter the fuel in the suction feed operation 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Loss of filtration 
function 
Unable to filter the foreign matter or 
contamination from the fuel 
Possible jams the fuel filter in the 
fuel feed line 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Component: Suction feed check valve 
Component function:  prevents fuel flow from boost pump back to fuel tank through the suction feed inlet. 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open 
Unable to perform the suction fuel 
feed when needed 
Loss of engine fuel feed 
redundancy 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Fails to close 
Loss of fuel feed flow and motive 
flow to the ejector pumps in flight 
Reduced engine fuel feed flow Major 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: scavenge ejector pump 
Component function:  transfers fuel to the collector tanks from other designated fuel tanks 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Loss of fuel flow 
Unable to transfer fuel to the 
associated collector tank; Inability to 
scavenge the water contamination 
from fuel 
Reduced fuel transfer flow to the 
collector tank. Increased 
unusable fuel. Possible water 
accumulation in the associated 
fuel tank. 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Reduced fuel flow 
Insufficient fuel transfer ability to the 
associated collector tank 
Reduced fuel transfer flow to the 
collector tank. 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Check valve in the 
pump fails to open 
Unable to transfer fuel to the 
associated collector tank; Loss of 
motive fuel flow from collector tank. 
Reduced fuel transfer flow to the 
collector tank. Fuel in the 
collector tank backflow into the 
associated tank. 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
 
 111 
Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: engine feed check valve 
Component function:  prevents fuel pressure from AC boost pumps in the other collector tanks, from also having to feed the 
scavenge ejector pumps in the wrong fuel tanks 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open 
Loss of pressurized fuel flow from 
the affected fuel tank. 
Possible reduced engine fuel 
feed capability. 
Possible cross feed needed. 
Fuel in the affected tank is 
unusable. 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Fails to close 
Possible feed fuel flow to scavenge 
ejector pumps in the wrong fuel 
tanks when the boost pumps in the 
associated fuel feed line shutoff. 
Possible reduced engine fuel 
feed capability. 
Possible increased unusable fuel.
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: AC boost pump pressure sensor 
Component function:  senses fuel pressure in the AC boost pump outlet 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
AC boost pump 
pressure sensor 
always indicates low 
fuel pressure 
Erroneous indications of AC boost 
pump failure when AC pump is in 
normal condition. 
Inaccurate caution message 
generated 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
AC boost pump 
pressure sensor never 
indicates low fuel 
pressure 
Inability to indicate low pressure in 
the AC boost pump outlet. 
Pilots are not aware of the AC 
pump status. 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Seal failure External or internal fuel leakage. 
External fuel spillage. Possible 
AC pump low pressure indication 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: DC boost pump pressure sensor 
Component function:  senses fuel pressure in the DC APU pump outlet 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
DC APU pump 
pressure sensor 
always indicates low 
fuel pressure 
Erroneous indications of DC APU 
pump failure when DC pump is in 
normal condition. 
Inaccurate caution message 
generated 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
DC APU pump 
pressure sensor never 
indicates low fuel 
pressure 
Inability to indicate low pressure in 
the DC APU pump outlet. 
Pilots are not aware of the DC 
pump status. 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Seal failure External or internal fuel leakage. 
External fuel spillage. Possible 
DC pump low pressure indication 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: shroud drain valve 
Component function:  drains the fuel leakage in the outer tube of double-wall fuel feed tubes and indicates the status of inner 
tubes. 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open 
Unable to drain the trapped fuel from 
the outer tube of associated fuel feed 
lines. 
None Minor Ground 
Fails to close 
Overboard fuel leakage from the fuel 
feed lines when the inner tube leaks.
None Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: refuel/defuel adapter 
Component function:  interface to refuel truck or ground refuelling station 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Single adapter damage 
Unable to remove refuel adapter cap 
or connect fuel nozzle 
Reduced pressure refuelling 
capability 
Minor Ground 
Both adapters damage 
Unable to remove refuel adapter cap 
or connect fuel nozzle 
Loss of pressure refuelling 
capability. Dispatch delay. 
Major Ground 
Seals failure Fuel leaking 
External fuel spillage. 
Possible external fuel spillage in 
the jettison operation. 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: refuel valve 
Component function:  enables or disables refuelling flow to each fuel tank 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open 
Unable to feed fuel from refuel/defuel 
manifold to the associated fuel tanks.
Unable to refuel associated fuel 
tanks. 
Dispatch delay. 
Minor Ground 
Fails to close 
Unable to shut off refuelling flow to 
the associated fuel tanks. 
Possible fuel tanks overfill or fuel 
spillage overboard. 
Possible fuel spillage. Major Ground 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: float valve 
Component function:  shut off the refuel valve when fuel level reached the designated level during refuel operation 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open 
Inability to open the associated refuel 
valve 
Unable to refuel associated fuel 
tanks. 
Dispatch delay. 
Minor Ground 
Fails to close 
Unable to close associated refuel 
valve and stop refuelling flow to the 
associated tanks. 
Possible fuel tanks overfill or fuel 
spillage overboard. 
Possible fuel spillage. Major Ground 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: manifold isolation valve 
Component function:  provides isolation between engine feed and refuel manifolds 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open Loss of defuel function Unable to defuel the aircraft Minor Ground 
Fails to close 
Loss of isolation between engine 
feed and refuel manifolds. 
None Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
External leak 
Left engine fuel feed line leaks fuel 
into centre fuel tank 
Reduced left engine fuel feed 
flow. Increased unusable fuel. 
Major Flight 
Internal leak 
Unable to stop fuel flow while 
defueling when commanded. 
Unable to stop fuel flow 
completely while defueling when 
commanded. Loss of isolation. 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Loss of valve position 
Erroneous indication of defuel shutoff 
valve failure 
Advisory message generated Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: refuel pressure switch 
Component function:  senses pressure of refuel manifold 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Always indicates low 
pressure 
Erroneous low pressure indication of 
refuel manifold 
Loss of the overpressure 
protection of refuel manifold 
Major Ground 
Never indicates low 
pressure 
Erroneous high pressure indication 
of refuel manifold 
Erroneous indication that close 
the refuel valve 
Minor Ground 
Seal failure 
External fuel leakage. 
Possible low pressure indication of 
refuel manifold 
External fuel spillage. 
Possible loss of the overpressure 
protection of refuel manifold 
Major Ground 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: integrated refuel panel 
Component function:  provides interface to ground crews for refuel and defuel operation 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Loss of refuel/defuel 
power on/off selection 
Unable to control application of 
power 
Loss of refuel function. 
Possible dispatch delay. 
Minor Ground 
Loss of manual control 
of refuel valve 
Unable refuel the fuel tanks manually Loss of manual refuelling function Minor Ground 
Loss of automatic 
control of refuel valve 
Unable to refuel the fuel tanks 
automatically 
Loss of automatic refuel function Minor Ground 
Loss of control of 
manifold isolation valve 
Unable to defuel the fuel tanks Loss of defuel function Minor Ground 
 
  
 121 
Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: flame arrestor 
Component function:  provides external fire blockage for surge tanks. 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Clogged element 
Loss of vent function while refuelling. Loss of refuel function Major Ground 
Loss of backup vent path. Loss of venting redundancy Major Flight 
Component: water drain valve 
Component function:  drains the water from the sump of fuel tanks 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open 
Unable to remove water from 
associated fuel tanks 
None Minor Ground 
Fails to close External fuel leakage External fuel spillage Minor Ground 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: flapper check valve in the structure ribs 
Component function:  allows fuel flow from outboard tanks to inboard tanks and prevents fuel flow to reverse direction. 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open Unable to pass fuel inboard Only significant if multiple valves 
and ejector pumps failure. 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Fails to close Unable to prevent fuel backflow Only significant if multiple valve 
failure 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Component: flapper check valve in the spanwise beams 
Component function:  allows fuel flow from backward tanks to forward tanks and prevents fuel flow to reverse direction. 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Fails to open Unable to pass fuel forward Only significant if multiple valves 
and ejector pumps failure. 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Fails to close Unable to prevent fuel backflow Reduced fuel transfer capability. Major 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: fuel management computer 
Component function:  processes signals from the sensors to perform monitoring and controlling of the fuel system 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Loss of fuel quantity 
processor operation 
Loss of fuel quantity data for 
associated tanks, automatic refuel, 
low fuel level warning functions. 
Loss of fuel quantity data, 
automatic refuel, low fuel level 
warning functions. 
Hazardous
Ground & 
flight 
Loss of operation of 
Bus communication 
Loss of fuel quantity data for 
associated tanks, automatic refuel, 
low fuel level warning, and critical 
fuel temperature warning functions. 
Loss of monitoring function and 
partly loss of control ability. 
Hazardous
Ground & 
flight 
Loss of signal from fuel 
quantity probe 
Loss of fuel quantity data of 
associated tanks. 
Loss of fuel quantity data of 
associated tanks. 
Hazardous
Ground & 
flight 
Loss of signal from fuel 
densitometer 
Inaccurate fuel quantity data of 
associated tanks. 
Inaccurate fuel quantity data of 
associated tanks. 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: fuel management computer 
Component function:  processes signals from the sensors to perform monitoring and controlling of the fuel system 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Loss of signal from low 
fuel level sensor 
Loss of low fuel warning function Loss of low fuel warning function Hazardous Flight 
Loss of signal from fuel 
temperature sensor 
Loss of critical fuel temperature 
warning function 
Loss of critical fuel temperature 
warning function 
Hazardous Flight 
Component: fuel quantity probe 
Component function:  measures fuel level 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Loss of valid output Erroneous indication of fuel quantity 
Loss of fuel quantity data of 
associated tanks 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Inaccurate output Erroneous indication of fuel quantity 
Inaccurate fuel quantity data of 
associated tanks 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: fuel densitometer 
Component function:  provides fuel density data to FMC 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Loss of valid output 
Inaccurate fuel quantity data of 
associated fuel tanks 
Inaccurate fuel quantity data of 
associated fuel tanks 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Inaccurate output 
Inaccurate fuel quantity data of 
associated fuel tanks 
Reduced fuel quantity data 
accuracy 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Component: fuel low level sensor 
Component function:  indicates the low fuel level 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
No signals output 
Loss of valid output from associated 
collector tanks 
Loss of low fuel level warning. Major Flight 
Always low level 
Erroneous warning message 
generated 
Erroneous warning message 
generated 
Major Flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: fuel temperature sensor 
Component function:  detects fuel temperature in each tank 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Loss of valid output 
Loss of fuel temperature data of 
associated fuel tanks 
Loss of fuel temperature 
monitoring function 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Inaccurate output 
Inaccurate fuel temperature data of 
associated fuel tanks 
Possible inaccurate low fuel 
temperature warning generated 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Component: fuel tank pressure sensor 
Component function:  senses surge tank pressure 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Always indicates 
low/high pressure 
Erroneous indication of surge tank 
pressure 
Wrong warning message 
generated 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Never indicates 
low/high pressure 
Unable to indicate critical pressure 
condition in surge tank 
Loss of warning function Hazardous
Ground & 
flight 
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Table C-1 Fuel System FMEA Summary (Cont.) 
Component: OBIGGS 
Component function:  generates nitrogen enriched air to inert fuel tanks 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Unable to generates 
NEA 
Loss of inerting function in the fuel 
tank 
Loss of fuel tank explosion 
suppression function 
Major 
Ground & 
flight 
Reduced NEA 
generation 
Loss of inerting function in the fuel 
tank 
Reduced fuel tank explosion 
suppression capability 
Minor 
Ground & 
flight 
Component: heat exchanger 
Component function:  cool down the inerting subsystem and hydraulic system 
Failure mode Effect on fuel system Effect on the aircraft 
Hazard 
class 
Flight 
Phase 
Heat exchanger 
overheat 
Possible ignition source in the fuel 
tank 
Possible fuel tank explosion Hazardous
Ground & 
flight 
Working fluid leakage Fuel system contamination Maintenance action required Major 
Ground & 
flight 
 
